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CITIZENS UNITED AND CORPORATE POLITICAL
SPEECH: DID THE SUPREME COURT ENHANCE
POLITICAL DISCOURSE OR
INVITE CORRUPTION?
Matthew A. Melone*
Electoral reform is a graveyard of well-intentioned plans gone awry.
It doesn't take an Einstein to discern a First Law of Political Ther-
modynamics-the desire for political power cannot be destroyed,
but at most, channeled into different forms-nor a Newton to iden-
tify a Third Law of Political Motion-every reform effort to con-
strain political actors produces a corresponding series of reactions
by those with the power to hold onto it.
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan
INTRODUCTION
It is not often that a decision by the Supreme Court prompts the
President of the United States to pointedly express his displeasure
with the Court during the State of the Union Address.2 Despite the
fact that President Obama may be eminently qualified to debate the
merits of the Court's reasoning in constitutional matters, his public
rebuke of the Court in that particular venue was surprising-and per-
haps lacking in decorum.3 That brief episode, however, effectively
captured the visceral feelings engendered by the Court's decision in
Citizens United v. FEC.4 To its supporters, Citizens United represents
the vindication of First Amendment liberties. To its detractors, the
case represents the surrender to corporate domination of the electoral
* Professor of Law, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
1. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1705 (1999).
2. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address
(Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-
union-address.
3. It appears that some members of the Court took exception to the President's remarks. See
Adam Liptak, A Justice Responds to Criticism from Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A17
(reporting that Justice Thomas defended the Court in a talk at Stetson University College of
Law). Chief Justice Roberts also believed that the President's remarks were inappropriate. See
Jeff Shesol, Editorial, Justices Will Prevail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at 10. He did not take
exception to the fact that the President disagreed with the Court's decision but rather that his
criticism was aired during the State of the Union Address. Id.
4. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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process-and the concomitant loss of confidence in the political sys-
tem that such domination will engender.
Campaign finance reform has a long and checkered history. Serious
efforts at reform began in the 1970s and culminated in a major legisla-
tive initiative in 2002.5 The courts, particularly the Supreme Court,
have had a major influence in shaping the legal landscape of campaign
finance and, consequently, the actual strategies and practices em-
ployed by campaign operatives.
Restrictions on campaign activities implicate First Amendment is-
sues. Like all First Amendment questions, competing interests are at
stake and quite often the Court, in its bitterly divided opinions, re-
flects societal rifts regarding the desirability, necessity, and legality of
campaign finance restrictions. Citizens United freed corporations to
engage in express political advocacy and disturbed what many be-
lieved was a well-settled principle supported by a century of prece-
dent. However, Citizens United should not have come as a surprise.
Several members of the Court had made their antipathy towards cam-
paign restrictions quite clear for a number of years. Once those mem-
bers were in the majority, Citizens United became inevitable.
Part II of this Article discusses campaign finance reform measures
up to the time of the 1970s-era legislation that formed the foundation
of present campaign finance rules.6 Early reform efforts were, for the
most part, toothless and ineffective. Part III analyzes the reform legis-
lation of the 1970s, the judicial decisions concerning that legislation,
and the effects that the legislation and Court decisions had on cam-
paign practices.7 This period saw the institution of contribution limi-
tations, various expenditure limitations, the rise of so-called soft
money, and the creation of an enforcement mechanism, the Federal
Election Commission. It also was a period in which the tension be-
tween the reform efforts and the First Amendment came to the fore-
front and the Court's decisions established constitutional parameters
that survive to this day.
Part IV focuses on the landmark campaign finance legislation en-
acted in 2002.8 It analyzes the legislation, several Supreme Court
cases concerning the First Amendment implications of that legislation,
and the changes in campaign finance practices that occurred in the
succeeding years. This period was characterized by the end of soft
money, the increased importance of independent advocacy groups,
5. See infra notes 59-279 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 11-58 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 59-180 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 181-279 and accompanying text.
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and the heightened focus on small-donor funding accelerated by tech-
nological developments. Moreover, it was also a period in which
members of the Supreme Court who had long believed that many
campaign finance restrictions were the antithesis of First Amendment
principles came into the majority.
Part V provides a detailed analysis of Citizens United, including the
Court's disposition of various as applied challenges to the 2002 legisla-
tion.9 Particular emphasis is placed on the Court's reasoning with re-
spect to the facial validity of the statute. Part VI is a critique of the
Citizens United decision and examines whether corporate liberties
should be treated as co-equal to individual rights and, if not, whether
corporate political speech restrictions should withstand First Amend-
ment attack.' 0 That Part concludes that restrictions on corporate
speech liberties can be more easily justified than similar restrictions
on individual freedom of expression. However, the asserted justifica-
tions for the restrictions imposed on corporate political speech are not
persuasive and, accordingly, the Court's strong First Amendment le-
anings were warranted.
II. .EARLY REFORM EFFORTS
Money has played a role in political campaigns since colonial times.
From our vantage point more than two centuries later, some early
campaign activities, such as George Washington's provision of food
and drink to eligible voters, appear quaint and relatively harmless."
The formation of political parties and their attendant ideological dif-
ferences-coupled with an expanding electorate due in part to immi-
gration-created the demand for vehicles that could broadly
disseminate political messages. 12 Newspapers, often subsidized by po-
litical parties or prominent individuals, became effective mouthpieces
for candidates or parties.' 3 Martin Van Buren introduced mass
9. See infra notes 280-363 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 364-448 and accompanying text.
11. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 1,
2-3 (2008) (discussing George Washington's campaign for a seat in the Virginia House of Bur-
gesses in 1757). As a campaign tool, liquor was vital. James Madison lost his race for reelection
to the Virginia legislature in 1777 due, in large part, to his refusal to provide liquor at his cam-
paign rallies. Id. at 3 n.13.
12. See id. at 4-5.
13. Id. Daniel Webster became personally indebted to the Second Bank of the United States
as a result of the bank's lending to the Whig Party newspaper. The bank's funding was moti-
vated by its desire to encourage opposition to Andrew Jackson's plan to revoke its charter.
Newspaper costs were the most significant campaign costs throughout the early 1800s. See Ben-
jamin S. Feuer, Comment, Between Political Speech and Cold, Hard Cash: Evaluating the FEC's
New Regulations for 527 Groups, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 925, 932 (2006).
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campaigning on behalf of Andrew Jackson, and by 1840, the nation
was treated to campaign pictures, buttons, parades, and conventions.14
As a consequence, the cost of campaigns swelled and the practice of
candidates self-financing their campaigns grew as small donor support
gave way to the hunt for large donor participation.15 Corporate con-
tributions began in earnest during Andrew Jackson's 1832 campaign,
motivated in large part by desire to prevent President Jackson from
making good on his pledge to revoke the charter of the Bank of the
United States. 16 Due to the proliferation of government contracts,
corporate giving expanded during the Civil War. Post-war reconstruc-
tion, the growth of the railroads, and the rapid industrialization of the
economy kept the money flowing from the corporate spigot. 17
The Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, which created the civil
service system, removed a significant source of party funds by elimi-
nating assessments on holders of patronage jobs.18 Although civil ser-
vice reform may have professionalized the government bureaucracy, it
also eliminated a vast pool of small donors from which parties could
obtain funds, heightening the relative importance of large donors. 19
The increasing relevance of government action to a rapidly industrial-
izing private sector eventually led to the predominance of corporate
funding of political campaigns.2 0
By the end of nineteenth century, some states had begun to regulate
campaign finance practices, and corporate contributions were the tar-
get of particular opprobrium. Initially, restrictions or outright bans on
14. Urofsky, supra note 11, at 5-6.
15. Id. at 6-7.
16. Id. at 7-8. See also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
17. Urofsky, supra note 11, at 8.
18. Among his achievements, Andrew Jackson introduced the "spoils system" to American
politics. Grateful office holders kicked back a percentage of their salaries to the party. By 1878,
approximately 90% of the Republican Party's congressional campaign committee income was
derived from such kickbacks. The Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, enacted in the wake of
President Garfield's assassination, created the federal civil service system and thus eliminated
the ability of parties to extract funds from patronage employees. See id. at 8-9.
19. See id. at 9-10.
20. Mark Hanna, the legendary chairman of the Republican Party, raised $250,000 each from
Standard Oil and J.P. Morgan and $400,000 from Chicago meatpacking houses during William
McKinley's 1892 presidential campaign. Id. at 11. Theodore Roosevelt raised almost three
quarters of his campaign funds from corporation interests in 1904. Id. at 12. The Democrats
were equally adept at corporate fundraising, including the progressive standard bearer, William
Jennings Bryan, who raised significant funds in 1896 from silver mining interests. Id. Not all
corporate funding flowed from the expectation of ex post favors from those who benefited from
the corporate largesse. Boies Penrose practiced corporate extortion by introducing legislation
that was unfavorable to corporate interests and then demanding contributions as the price to kill
the bills in committee. See Feuer, supra note 13, at 933 (describing the practices of Penrose, the
Pennsylvania Republican Party chairman).
[Vol. 60:2932
2010] CITIZENS UNITED & CORP. POLITICAL SPEECH
corporate contributions were prompted more by efforts at political
payback than by bipartisan principles aimed at good governance. 21
However, a growing reform movement was incubating across the po-
litical spectrum. Conservative attorney Elihu Root urged New York
to prohibit corporate campaign contributions and echoed sentiments
that resonate to this day:
The idea . . . is to prevent the great railroad companies, the great
insurance companies, the great telephone companies, the great ag-
gregations of wealth, from using their corporate funds, directly or
indirectly, to send members of the legislature to these halls, in order
to vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests
as against those of the public.
It strikes . .. at a constantly growing evil ... which has ... done
more to shake the confidence of the plain people of small means in
our political institutions, than any other practice which has ever ob-
tained since the foundation of our government. And I believe that
the time has come when something ought to be done to put a check
upon the giving of $50,000 or $100,000 by great corporation toward
political purposes, upon the understanding that a debt is created
from a political party to it.22
An investigation into the practices of corporate officers of certain
large insurance companies brought to light the extent of corporate
support for the Republican Party and provided a tailwind for support-
ers of reform. 2 3 In 1907, Congress enacted the Tillman Act, making it
unlawful for any national bank or federally chartered corporation to
contribute money "in connection with any election to any political of-
fice." 2 4 Moreover, the Act prohibited any corporation from contribut-
ing money in connection with any U.S. presidential or congressional
election.25 The Tillman Act proved ineffective. The Act's prohibi-
21. For example, Nebraska, Missouri, Tennessee, and Florida prohibited corporate campaign
contributions in 1897. Urofsky, supra note 11, at 13. These states were carried by William Jen-
nings Bryan in the 1896 presidential election, and bans on corporate contributions were seen as
retaliation against the overwhelming corporate support for William McKinley. Id.
22. Id. at 13-14 (quoting ELIHu ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP
143-44 (1916) (alterations in original)).
23. Id. at 14-15.
24. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864. Limited campaign finance reform mea-
sures were enacted previously. The Navy Appropriations Bill of 1867 prohibited the solicitation
of funds from workers at U.S. Naval yards. Robert E. Mutch, Three Centuries of Campaign
Finance Law, in A USER'S GUIDE TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 1, 12 (Gerald C. Lubenow
ed.. 2001) The Enforcement Act of 1870 prohibited certain practices during federal election
campaigns. Ch. XI, 16 Stat. 63. In 1877 President Rutherford B. Hayes issued an Executive
Order prohibiting assessments on federal employees for political purposes. Urofsky, supra note
11, at 12. See also Jon Simon Stefanuca, The Fall of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971:
A Public Choice Explanation, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 237, 239 (2008) (discussing the
history of federal election reform legislation).
25. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. at 864-65.
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tions were limited to donations of money and corporations soon
shifted to in-kind contributions of property, travel accommodations,
and labor.26  Moreover, the Act provided no enforcement
mechanism.27
The Publicity of Political Contributions Act (the Contributions Act)
was enacted in 1910, and it required post-election disclosure of dona-
tions to candidates for the House of Representatives. 28 Amendments
were soon made to the Contributions Act that extended the disclosure
rules to elections for the Senate and put in place spending caps on
House of Representatives and Senate races.29 Like the Tillman Act,
this legislation also proved ineffective. The Contributions Act did not
provide an enforcement mechanism and applied only to donations in
election years.30 Moreover, it covered only donations to national
party committees and the candidates themselves, doing little to rein in
state party committees and newly created independent committees.31
In 1918, the Supreme Court held that the Contributions Act was un-
constitutional in its application to primaries and Senate races. 32 The
inapplicability of the disclosure rules to primaries was particularly
eviscerating because, in the South, the Democratic primaries were
where the election was won for all practical purposes.33 Although the
Court did not invalidate the legislation in its entirety, the Wilson Ad-
ministration took the position that the entire Act was invalidated and
that the disclosure requirements were no longer in effect. 34
Foreshadowing the effects of Watergate several decades later, a ma-
jor political scandal prompted the next wave of campaign finance re-
form. Investigations of the Harding Administration in connection
with the Teapot Dome scandal revealed large contributions by oil in-
terests to the Republican Party and led to the passage of the Federal
26. See Urofsky, supra note 11, at 17.
27. Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. at 864-65. See also Urofsky, supra note 11, at 17.
28. Contributions Act, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822, 822-24 (1910).
29. Publicity of Political Contributions Act, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25, 25-29 (1911). See also Urofsky,
supra note 11, at 18.
30. Contributions Act, 36 Stat. at 822-24. The legislation did provide for fines or imprison-
ment. § 10, 36 Stat. at 824.
31. § 1, 36 Stat. at 822-23 (defining political committees to include national committees and
committees that operated in two or more states).
32. See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 258 (1921). Chief Justice White believed that
the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment would allow the legislation to pass constitutional
muster insofar as it applied to Senate races. Id. at 261 (White, C.J., dissenting). Note that the
Supreme Court later reversed course with respect to congressional regulation of primaries and
held that Congress did indeed have the authority to regulate primary elections. See United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317 (1941).
33. Urofsky, supra note 11, at 18.
34. See id. at 19.
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Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 (the Corrupt Practices Act).35 This leg-
islation extended the Tillman Act's corporate-donation prohibition to
in-kind contributions, 36 improved upon the 1910 disclosure rules by
requiring the disclosure of contributions regardless of when they were
made,37 and raised the spending ceilings applicable to Senate races.38
Again, Congress failed to provide enforcement mechanisms and the
Corrupt Practices Act's provisions were riddled with loopholes that
proved easy to exploit.39
The ascension of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the White
House ushered in a new player in the campaign finance arena: labor
unions. Organized labor, as evidenced by various pieces of labor-
friendly New Deal legislation, had an ally in the White House and
rewarded Democrats with cash and sweat in the form of volunteers. 40
Various public works programs, such as the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity and the Public Works Administration, employed millions of work-
ers outside the strictures of the Pendleton Act.41 A coalition of
Republican and conservative Democrats, concerned that President
Roosevelt was using the New Deal programs to build a political base,
was able to enact the Hatch Political Activity Act (the Hatch Act) in
1939.42 The Hatch Act banned contributions and participation in
campaigns by all government employees, not solely those employed in
civil service under the Pendleton Act.4 3 The Hatch Act was quickly
amended to extend the contribution ban to federal contractors and
employees of state agencies that were recipients of federal funding,
and the amendments capped contributions to national committees and
35. Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1070, 1070.
36. § 301(d), 43 Stat. at 1071.
37. §§ 303-308, 43 Stat. at 1071-73.
38. § 309, 43 Stat. at 1073. See also Urofsky, supra note 11, at 20.
39. Urofsky, supra note 11, at 21. The Act was repealed by the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (1972). See infra notes 59-70 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
40. For example, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 195, 199,
assured labor of the right to collective bargaining and required industrial codes to adopt mini-
mum wage and maximum hour provisions. After the Supreme Court held the Act unconstitu-
tional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935), the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 was enacted and the right of labor to collective
bargaining was reaffirmed and policed by the newly established National Labor Relations
Board. The Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), provided for minimum
wages, maximum hours, and safety measures for workers engaged in interstate commerce. See
52 Stat. at 1062-63.
41. Urofsky, supra note 11, at 25. See also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Pendleton Act.
42. Hatch Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939).
43. 53 Stat. at 1147. See also Urofsky, supra note 11, at 25.
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placed a spending limit on such committees." Like the previous re-
forms, the restrictions imposed by the Hatch Act were relatively easy
to avoid and accomplished little actual reform.45
The bitter public reaction over the United Mine Workers strike dur-
ing World War II made the enactment of the War Labor Disputes Act
possible over President Roosevelt's veto. 4 6 This legislation prohibited
labor union campaign contributions for the duration of the war. 4 7 Al-
though narrow in scope, it had a lasting effect because labor unions
avoided its prohibition by forming political action committees (PACs),
whose presence on the campaign scene proved to be long-lasting. 48
The Republican takeover of Congress in 1946 led to the passage-
again, over a Presidential veto-of the Taft-Hartley Act, which made
permanent the War Labor Disputes Act's ban on union campaign con-
tributions.4 9 Moreover, the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited all corporate
and union political expenditures, including internal union communica-
tions with members.50 The legislation was quickly challenged and the
Supreme Court held that it did not operate to ban internal union com-
munication.51 Subsequently, the ban on external political expendi-
tures was challenged on First Amendment grounds, but the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the district court on procedural grounds
where the union was eventually acquitted.5 2 Thus, the restrictions
placed on corporate and union political speech were first challenged
in the organized labor context, leading to tension between reform ef-
forts and First Amendment liberties.
By this time, television had begun to dramatically alter the political
landscape. Campaign costs increased significantly and the emerging
medium began to erode the role of political parties and shifted the
44. Urofsky, supra note 11, at 25. Title II of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
repealed the Hatch Act's limitation on individual contributions to national committees and the
spending limits imposed on such committees but imposed spending limitations on the candidates
directly. The statute prohibited a candidate from making expenditures from his personal funds
or the personal funds of his immediate family in excess of $50,000 for presidential or vice-presi-
dential candidates, and $35,000 and $25,000 for Senate and House of Representatives candi-
dates, respectively. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 202, 86 Stat. 3,
9 (1972).
45. See Urofsky, supra note 11, at 25-26.
46. War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163 (1943).
47. §9, 57 Stat. at 167-68.
48. Corporations, at this point in time, did not make extensive use of PACs because there was
some doubt as to their legality and, due to lack of enforcement of existing laws, corporations felt
no compelling need to funnel funds through PACs. See Urofsky, supra note 11, at 28-29.
49. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159-60 (1947).
50. Id. See also Urofsky, supra note 11, at 27 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 79-2739, at 40 (1946)).
51. See United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 123-24 (1948).
52. See United States v. Int'l UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 592-93 (1957); Urofsky, supra note 11, at 28.
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focus of campaign financing more squarely on the candidates.53 Rap-
idly escalating costs resulted in permanent, year-round fundraising in
contrast to what had been a more cyclical process. 54 Moreover, the
candidates began to directly engage in solicitation activities and often
had little use for the national party committee apparatus.55 These de-
velopments led to increasing concern over the corruptive influence of
corporate funding and the concomitant erosion of public confidence in
the entire political system.56 Despite these concerns, reform attempts
stalled throughout the 1950s and 60s.5 7 Finally, in 1971, major changes
were enacted. The Watergate scandal prompted more dramatic re-
forms later that decade and provided the motivation to enforce these
reforms.58
III. THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 197159 (the Campaign Act)
was a comprehensive effort to impede the rapidly rising costs of presi-
dential and congressional elections and provide candidates with
greater access to media to enable them to better explain their posi-
tions on issues.60 The legislation also sought to equalize the playing
53. Television placed a premium on the ability to deliver effective sound bites and increased
the importance of the personal characteristics of the candidates, such as physical appearance.
See Urofsky, supra note 11, at 31. Previously, such characteristics were not particularly relevant
to electoral success. Id. The Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960 probably did more than any other
event to focus attention on the power of television as a campaign tool. Id.
54. Combined Democratic and Republican spending on presidential elections grew from ap-
proximately $5 million for the 1948 election to almost $37 million for the 1968 election. Id. at 41.
The Nixon-McGovern election in 1972 cost approximately $91 million. Id. The costs associated
with Senate and House campaigns also experienced exponential increases. Id. at 42.
55. Most famously, President Nixon formed his own reelection committee, the Committee to
Re-Elect the President. This committee, often referred to as CREEP, played a central role in
the Watergate scandal as did many of its officers, including former U.S. Attorney General John
Mitchell. The comings and goings of CREEP were compellingly told in a best-selling book. See
generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODwARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974) (chronicling
the Washington Post's investigation of the Watergate break-in and subsequent cover-up by the
Nixon Administration).
56. See Urofsky, supra note 11, at 44-45.
57. Id. at 39-40.
58. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
59. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006)).
60. S. REP. No. 92-229 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1822. The Revenue Act
of 1971 was also enacted; it put into place public funding of presidential campaigns through
voluntary taxpayer contributions. See Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 801-802, 85
Stat. 497, 562-74. A similar provision was enacted in 1966 but was not implemented. In fact,
this provision of the Revenue Act of 1971 was not to be implemented until the 1976 election.
See Urofsky, supra note 11, at 49. The Revenue Act of 1971 also provided a modest individual
tax credit or, in the alternative, a deduction for political contributions, both of which were later
repealed. §§ 701(a), 702(a), 85 Stat. at 560-62; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
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field by eliminating the advantages enjoyed by wealthy candidates and
shifting focus away from limiting individual contributions to enhanced
disclosure of those contributions. Title I of the Campaign Act pro-
vided express limitations on the amount that broadcast and non-
broadcast media could charge political candidates. 61 Moreover, Title I
of the Campaign Act imposed spending limitations on candidates with
respect to media purchases. 62 Title II of the Campaign Act expanded
the definition of political contributions and expenditures, liberalized
the rules to allow bona fide loans to political candidates, and defined
the term "political committee" very broadly.63 Title II repealed the
Hatch Act's limitation on individual contributions to national commit-
tees and the spending limits imposed on such committees but imposed
spending limitations on the candidates directly.64 The statute prohib-
ited a candidate from making expenditures from his personal funds or
the personal funds of his immediate family in excess of $50,000 for
presidential or vice-presidential candidates, and $35,000 and $25,000
§ 112(a), 100 Stat. 2108. Current law certainly does not subsidize political expenditures. It pro-
hibits any deduction for amounts paid or incurred in influencing legislation, participating or in-
tervening in any political campaign, attempting to influence the general public, or segments
thereof, with respect to elections, legislative matters, or referendums, and communicating di-
rectly with certain executive branch officials. See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1) (2006). Moreover, dues
paid to tax-exempt organizations, such as trade associations, that are allocable to such activities
are similarly non-deductible. § 162(e)(3). Deductions for certain indirect contributions to politi-
cal parties, such as advertising in convention programs and other publications and admission
costs to dinners and inaugural events are also not deductible. § 276(a). See also § 271 (prohibit-
ing bad deductions or losses from worthless debts owed by political parties for all taxpayers
except banks).
61. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, § 103, 86 Stat. at 4. Broadcast stations were pro-
hibited from charging legally qualified candidates an amount in excess of the "lowest unit
charge" for air time of the same class and time during a forty-five day period preceding the date
of a primary election or a sixty day period preceding the date of a general election. Id. Print
media could not impose charges in excess of charges made for comparable use of space for other
purposes. Id.
62. A legally qualified candidate was prohibited from spending for the use of communication
media in excess of an amount based on the voting age population of the geographic area in
which the election for office was held or $50,000, whichever was greater. § 104, 86 Stat. at 5.
Spending on broadcast media was limited to sixty percent of the total spending limit on commu-
nication media. Id.
63. The statute defined the term "contribution" as
a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value (except a
loan of money by a national or State bank made in accordance with the applicable
banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of business), made for the
purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of any person to Fed-
eral office . ...
§ 201, 86 Stat. at 8. Expenditures were similarly defined. Id. A political committee was defined
as "any individual, committee, association, or organization which accepts contributions or makes
expenditures during a calendar year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000." Id.
64. Id.
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for Senate and House of Representatives candidates, respectively.65
The long-standing prohibitions on corporate and union contributions
were undisturbed by the legislation.
Title III of the Campaign Act established detailed disclosure re-
quirements for political committees 66 that were administered by the
U.S. Comptroller General.67 Among the reporting requirements was
the disclosure of all donors who contributed $100 or more to a politi-
cal committee.68
The Campaign Act was decidedly pro-incumbent-one commenta-
tor opined that Congress behaved "like an oil cartel" in passing the
legislation. 69 The spending limitations on both broadcast and non-
broadcast media tended to favor incumbents because such limitations
impeded the ability of challengers to overcome the publicity inherent
to incumbency. Moreover, incumbents tend to be better financed and
are therefore in a better position to secure the bank financing that the
legislation allowed. Like prior legislative efforts, the Campaign Act
failed to provide an effective enforcement mechanism, thereby failing
to diminish any proclivity a candidate had to skirt the spending limits
imposed by the legislation. The Campaign Act also failed to regulate
some expenditures that could aid in the conduct of a campaign.70 The
Watergate scandal and the attendant shenanigans of the Nixon Ad-
ministration-often funded by money received by the Committee to
Re-elect the President-ensured that the system set in place by this
legislation would be short-lived.
A. The 1974 Amendments
The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 197471 (the
1974 Amendments) did significantly more than shore up the perceived
shortcomings of the 1971 legislation. Indeed, they dramatically al-
tered the legal landscape of campaign finance. Repudiating the no-
tion that detailed disclosure rules vitiated the need for contribution
and spending limits, the 1974 Amendments imposed a $1,000 limit on
the amount any person could contribute to any candidate with respect
65. § 202, 86 Stat. at 9-10.
66. § 302, 86 Stat. at 11-19.
67. § 307, 86 Stat. at 17.
68. § 301, 86 Stat. at 15.
69. Stefanuca, supra note 24, at 253.
70. Id. at 266.
71. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
[hereinafter 1974 Amendments].
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to any election for federal office.72 In addition, political committees
other than a candidate's principal campaign committee could not con-
tribute more than $5,000 to any candidate with respect to any election
for federal office.73 Aggregate individual contributions during a cal-
endar year were capped at $25,000.74 Further amendments in 1976
placed a $20,000 limitation on contributions to national political party
committees and a $5,000 limitation on contributions to other political
committees.75
In addition to the contribution limits, the 1974 Amendments im-
posed spending caps on candidates, committees authorized to make
expenditures by the candidate, national and state committees of politi-
cal parties, and certain persons authorized to make expenditures by
the candidate or authorized committees. 76 The limits, adjusted for in-
72. § 101, 88 Stat. at 1263. "[C]ontributions to a named candidate made to any political com-
mittee authorized by such candidate ... to accept contributions on his behalf" were considered
contributions to the candidate. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(4) (2006)). In the aftermath
of the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, discussed infra at notes 88-109 and accom-
panying text, the statute was amended again to include within the definition of contributions
"expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the re-
quest or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents .... "
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112, 90 Stat. 475,
488 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7) (2006)) [hereinafter 1976 Amendments].
73. 1974 Amendments, § 101(b)(2), 88 Stat. at 1264. The contribution limit did apply to a
candidate's principal campaign committee to the extent such committee contributed to the cam-
paign of other candidates. Id. The 1974 Amendments also prevented the use of intermediaries
or conduits to skirt the contribution limitations. § 101, 88 Stat. at 1264. In response to disclo-
sures of large cash contributions to the Nixon reelection campaign, cash contributions were lim-
ited to $100. § 101, 88 Stat. at 1268.
74. Contributions made during a calendar year preceding the election year were deemed
made during the election year. § 101, 88 Stat. at 1263.
75. Limitations were also placed on multicandidate committees. See 1976 Amendments,
§ 320, 90 Stat. at 487 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a). The limitations on contributions to political
committees that engage in independent advocacy were, as a result of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Citizens United v. FEC, struck down by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. See infra notes 364-65 and accompanying text.
76. 1974 Amendments, § 101, 88 Stat. at 1264. Spending limits on national and state party
committees were much more liberal than the expenditure limits placed on other persons. In
general, these committees were entitled to spend amounts that were determined by the voting
age population of the United States for presidential elections, §101(f)(2), 88 Stat. at 1265, and by
the voting age population of a state for both senatorial and congressional elections in a single
district state. §101(c)(1)(D), 88 Stat. at 1264. The spending cap for other House of Representa-
tives elections was $10,000. § 101(f)(3)(B), 88 Stat. at 1266. The Supreme Court struck down
these restrictions with respect to independent party expenditures but upheld them in the case of
coordinated expenditures. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colo. I), 518 U.S.
604, 614-15, 618, 622-23 (1996); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colo. II), 533
U.S. 431, 447, 456 (2001). See also infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text. The higher contri-
bution limits for donations to political parties combined with the ability of national and state
parties to spend significantly more funds than others led to a heightened role for the parties in
campaign fundraising. See infra notes 85, 164-65 and accompanying text. The Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Act) increased the contribution limits for dona-
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flation, were set at $10,000,000 for presidential primaries and
$20,000,000 for presidential elections. 7 7 Lower limits were imposed
for Senate and House of Representatives elections.78  The spending
limits imposed on the use of a candidate's own funds and the funds of
his immediate family by the 1971 legislation were left in place, al-
though loans that were evidenced by a written instrument were per-
mitted. 79  The 1974 Amendments also placed a $1,000 limit on
independent political expenditures.s0 Although labor unions had es-
tablished PACs as early as 1943, the 1974 Amendments clarified their
legal status."'
In contrast to previously enacted reform legislation, the 1974
Amendments did include an effective enforcement mechanism. Sec-
tion 208 of the 1974 Amendments established the Federal Election
Commission (the FEC).82 It provided the FEC with formidable en-
forcement powers, rule-making authority, and the authority to issue
advisory opinions.83
tions and indexed them for inflation. McCain-Feingold Act, § 307, 116 Stat. 81, 102 (codified at
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)).
77. 1974 Amendments, § 101(c)(1), 88 Stat. at 1264.
78. § 101, 88 Stat. at 1265-66. Special limitations were provided for the national committee
and state committees of political parties. § 101, 88 Stat. at 1265-66.
79. § 101, 88 Stat. at 1266.
80. The Act prohibited any expenditure "relative to a clearly identified candidate ... which,
when added to all other expenditures ... advocating the election or defeat of such candidate"
made during the calendar year exceeded $1,000. § 101, 88 Stat. at 1265.
81. The 1971 legislation did exclude, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 610, "the establishment, ad-
ministration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for
political purposes by a corporation or labor organization" from the definition of contribution or
expenditure. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3, 10
(1972) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610). The 1974 Amendments clarified the legitimacy of PACs.
See 1974 Amendments, § 103, 88 Stat. at 1272 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 611). This provision codi-
fied the Supreme Court's decision in Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S.
385 (1972), which held that the 1971 legislation permitted union officials to administer PACs. Id.
at 416-20. PAC funding received a boost after the FEC issued an advisory opinion in 1975 that
allowed Sun Oil to spend corporate funds in order to solicit contributions to its PAC from stock-
holders and employees. See FEC Advisory Op. 1975-23, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,879 (July 29, 1975).
82. 1974 Amendments, § 310(a)(1), 88 Stat. at 1280 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (2006)).
The FEC is comprised of six voting members, no more than three of which can be affiliated with
the same political party, and two non-voting ex-officio members. § 310(a)(1), 88 Stat. at
1280-81. Legislation enacted in 1976 provided that the voting members of the FEC were to be
appointed by the President. See 1976 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 101(a)(1), 90 Stat. 475,
475 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1)). Legislation enacted in 1997 limited commissioners to
one six-year term. See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-61, § 512(a), 111 Stat. 1272, 1305 (1997) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(2)(A)).
83. 1974 Amendments, H§ 311-315, 88 Stat. at 1282-85 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437d).
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Despite these improvements, the law did have its flaws. The legisla-
tion made no distinction between "hard" and "soft" money.84 How-
ever, amendments enacted in 1979 allowed donors to contribute an
unlimited amount of funds to political parties for certain party-build-
ing activities.85 These soft money activities would prove to be a signif-
icant source of consternation for reformers and would ultimately serve
as the impetus for later reforms.86 The legislative efforts of the 1970s
established a campaign finance regime with contribution and spending
limitations, elaborate disclosure rules, a commission with enforcement
powers, and a continued ban on corporate and union contributions
and expenditures. These efforts also assured prominent roles for
PACs and political parties in the funding of political campaigns. How-
ever, the courts would shake this system to its foundations, and cam-
paign finance practices over the next two decades would usher in
another set of major reforms.
B. Judicial Developments
1. Buckley v. Valeo
Political speech and political association have long held an exalted
position in First Amendment jurisprudence. 7 Consequently, little
time passed before the constitutionality of the 1971 Act and its 1974
amendments were tested. In 1976, the Supreme Court decided Buck-
ley v. Valeo.88 It is difficult to overestimate Buckley's effect on cam-
paign finance activity because, in addition to undoing many of the
reform provisions, it set into motion practices that would dominate
campaign finance for over two decades. At issue were various contri-
bution and expenditure limits imposed by the 1974 Amendments and
the disclosure rules of the Campaign Act as amended.
84. "Hard money" refers to contributions subject to statutory contribution limitations. "Soft
money" refers to contributions not subject to such restrictions.
85. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 101, 93
Stat. 1339, 1340 (1980) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)); FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10 (Nov. 21,
1978), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao?SUBMIT=ao&AO=2392 (reporting the
inability of the FEC to obtain the necessary four votes to require that the costs of certain activi-
ties be allocated to federal election activities and subjected to the contribution and spending
limits). See also Urofsky, supra note 11, at 61-62.
86. See infra notes 181-218 and accompanying text.
87. "Indeed, the First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech ut-
tered during a campaign for political office." Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). See also
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957).
88. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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The Court distinguished the contribution and expenditure limita-
tions from permissible time, place, and manner restrictions.89 The
Court stated that it "has never suggested that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to intro-
duce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required
by the First Amendment."90 Moreover, the Court took notice of the
effect of mass communication on campaign finance and recognized
the strong link between money and the ability to amplify and effec-
tively disseminate political messages to the electorate.91 The Court
found that the contribution and expenditure limitations passed muster
under strict scrutiny. 92
According to the Court, political contributions and political expend-
itures are not entitled to the same degree of First Amendment protec-
tion. The Court held that reasonable limitations may be placed on
political contributions because the "actuality and appearance of cor-
ruption resulting from large individual financial contributions" was a
sufficiently compelling interest to justify infringements on an other-
wise protected First Amendment liberty interest. 93 The Court wrote
that such contribution limits "do not undermine to any material de-
gree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates
and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institu-
tional press, candidates, and political parties." 94 Insofar as the contri-
bution limitations focused "precisely on the problem of large
campaign contributions," they were narrowly tailored to meet the
government's compelling interest of preventing actual or perceived
corruption. 95 Consequently, the 1974 Amendments' restrictions on
campaign donations to candidates and political committees passed
constitutional muster.96
89. Id. at 17-19.
90. Id. at 16. Some scholars and commentators believe that the Court has not examined re-
strictions on campaign contributions with the same level of strict scrutiny applied in other First
Amendment contexts. They assert that the direct and imminent causal link between speech
restrictions and the compelling government interest sought to be achieved, required by the
landmark case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), has been relaxed in the
campaign finance setting. See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Where Speech Loses Its Luster: Campaign
Finance Laws and the Constitutional Downgrading of Political Speech, 12 NEXUS 83, 89 (2007);
Rachel Gage, Note, Randall v. Sorrell: Campaign-Finance Regulation and the First Amendment
as a Facilitator of Democracy, 5 FIRsT AMENDMENT L. REV. 341, 342-43 (2007).
91. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
92. Id. at 44-45.
93. Id. at 26.
94. Id. at 29.
95. Id. at 28.
96. Id. at 29, 35-36, 38. The Court rejected the argument that the $1,000 contribution limita-
tion was unreasonably low. Id. at 30. Having determined that some limitation was justified, the
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In contrast, the Court held that the $1,000 limitation on indepen-
dent expenditures, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from
personal or family resources, and the limitation on overall campaign
expenditures all violated the First Amendment. 97 The Court held that
the primary effect of these provisions was "to restrict the quantity of
campaign speech by individuals, groups, and candidates." 98 Unlike
political contributions, the risk of quid pro quo corruption was not
implicated by political expenditures.9 9 The government's anticorrup-
tion interest in limiting expenditures was not sufficient to justify the
limitations. 00 Also, in striking down the expenditure limitations, the
Court expressly denied that the government's ancillary interest in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals to influence the outcome
of elections-or equalizing the relative financial resources of compet-
ing candidates-was sufficiently compelling to warrant the infringe-
ment such restrictions imposed on First Amendment liberties.' 0
Although the Court invalidated the expenditure limitations on First
Amendment grounds, it first analyzed whether the independent ex-
penditure limitation was unconstitutionally vague. This analysis
proved to be one of the more enduring features of the decision. The
1974 Amendments limited independent expenditures to $1,000 per
year and defined such expenditures as "any expenditure ... relative to
a clearly identified candidate . . . advocating the election or defeat of
such candidate."1 02 The Court found that this language was impermis-
Court believed that it was outside its purview to tinker with matters of degree. See id. The
Court also rejected the assertion that contribution limitations were a form of invidious discrimi-
nation by incumbents against would be challengers. Id. at 30-32.
97. Id. at 51, 54, 58. Although the independent expenditure ban imposed by the statute,
discussed supra at note 80 and accompanying text, also applied to corporations and labor unions,
the Court did not reach the issue of whether a specific corporate and union expenditure prohibi-
tion was permissible. In fact, the corporate and union expenditure ban was recodified not long
after the Buckley decision. See 1976 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 321, 90 Stat. 475, 490
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
98. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.
99. With respect to the independent expenditure limitation the Court held that such limitation
was unconstitutional even if it was assumed that such expenditures posed the same dangers of
quid pro quo corruption as contributions. Id. at 45. The Court's reasoning was predicated on its
interpretation of the statute in order to avoid unconstitutional vagueness. Id. See also infra
notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
100. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55. The Court's insistence on quid pro quo corruption as the justifi-
cation necessary to support infringement on First Amendment liberties has been subject to criti-
cism. For example, one commentator has criticized Buckley for not recognizing the
anticorruption principles embodied in various clauses of the U.S. Constitution and for its too
narrow conception of corruption. See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Princi-
ple, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 341 (2009).
101. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17.
102. 1974 Amendments, Pub L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1265. See also supra note 80
and accompanying text.
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sibly vague because the distinction between the mere discussion of
issues and candidates, on the one hand, and advocacy on the other
hand "may often dissolve in practical application." 103
In order to preserve the statutory provision, the Court held that the
provision must be interpreted to cover only "expenditures for commu-
nications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat" of a
candidate.104 In a footnote, the Court provided examples of such ex-
press advocacy: the so-called magic words. 05 Thus, although the
Court struck down the statute in part, its interpretation of this particu-
lar provision opened the door for unregulated issue advocacy and the
explosion of soft money to fund such advocacy. 106 The fact that Buck-
ley was interpreted to stand for the proposition that issue advocacy
was beyond regulation may be criticized. The Court, by limiting the
reach of the statute to the "magic words," merely prevented the stat-
ute from being unconstitutionally vague. On its face, Buckley did not
appear to provide speech including the magic words automatic First
Amendment protection. Nothing in the Court's opinion suggested
that clear, unambiguous statutory language prescribing more than the
magic words would necessarily violate the First Amendment. The sta-
tus of the magic words would resurface with the passage of the Bipar-
tisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the McCain-Feingold Act).10 7
103. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
104. Id. at 44.
105. The Court defined express advocacy to include words or phrases such as "vote for,"
"elect," "support," "defeat," and "reject." Id. at 44 n.52. The Court then used this interpreta-
tion of the statute in refusing to uphold it under an actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption
rationale reasoning that preventing express advocacy expenditures would fail to sufficiently
eliminate the dangers of such expenditures because the statute could be easily circumvented.
See id. at 45.
106. The Court, in dismissing the assertion that independent expenditures could easily be used
to circumvent contribution limitations by simply coordinating such expenditures with the candi-
date, held that such coordinated expenditures would be captured under the contribution limita-
tion provisions. Id. at 46. At the time, the statute's definition of contributions did not make this
result so apparent and the statute was amended shortly after the Court rendered its decision to
expressly include coordinated expenditures within its ambit. See supra note 72 and accompany-
ing text. The McCain-Feingold Act required that expenditures coordinated with a political
party committee be treated as contributions to such party committee, limited the ability of par-
ties to make coordinated expenditures once a nominee for election was selected, and charged the
FEC with the issuance of new regulations governing coordinated expenditures. See infra notes
202-03 and accompanying text. The FEC has had a devilish time in attempting to define just
what constitutes coordination. See Meredith A. Johnston, Note, Stopping "Winks and Nods":
Limits on Coordination as a Means of Regulating 527 Organizations, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1166,
1176-79 (2006). See also infra note 203 and accompanying text.
107. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Court upheld the disclosure requirements of the Cam-
paign Act and the 1974 Amendments. 08 The Court found that the
government's interest in providing more information to both the elec-
torate and enforcement authorities, thereby deterring corruption
through increased exposure, was sufficient to overcome the burdens
imposed on individuals' rights to association. However, the Court
made clear that as applied challenges were not precluded by its hold-
ing in the event that disclosure requirements exposed members or
supporters of historically suspect organizations to reprisal. 109
Of course, Buckley would not be the last word on campaign finance
restrictions, but it did provide the overarching framework by which
campaign finance restrictions would be measured. In general, contri-
bution limitations and disclosure requirements were valid, campaign
expenditure limitations were unconstitutional, and independent issue-
advocacy expenditures were outside the purview of the regulators.
The long-standing ban on corporate and union contributions remained
intact. Post-Buckley cases, often involving state law restrictions,
dashed any hope for doctrinal consistency from the courts. Moreover,
changes in the composition of the Supreme Court would call into
question the continued vitality of Buckley itself.
108. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 84. The Court also upheld the constitutionality of the system of
voluntary presidential election expenditure limitations tied to public financing via voluntary in-
come tax return check-offs. See id. at 90-92.
109. The Court was well aware of this possibility. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1958). In Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982), the
Court struck down an Ohio law requiring that every political party report the names and ad-
dresses of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign contributions. The Court held that
the exposure of corruption made possible by disclosure rules had little relevance to minor parties
given their low likelihood of success at the polls. Id. at 95. The history of harassment against the
Socialist Workers Party convinced the Court that the potential misuse of the required informa-
tion outweighed the government's interest in obtaining the information. Id. at 100-01. The dis-
closure rules have occasionally been criticized on broader grounds. For instance, a former
Federal Election Commissioner stated,
Campaign finance disclosure rules have encouraged harassment of donors and coars-
ened public debate. ...
But it's far from clear that the forced disclosure of political contributions has bene-
fited society. Disclosure has resulted in government-enabled invasions of privacy-and
sometime outright harassment-and it has added to a political climate in which candi-
dates are judged by their funders rather than their ideas.
Notable & Quotable, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2010, at A23 (quoting former Federal Election Com-
missioner Bradley A. Smith's remarks in the Winter 2010 City Journal). However, in a recent
case, the Court rejected a facial challenge to Washington's Public Records Act under which the
names and addresses of individuals that signed a petition to initiate a referendum that would
overturn a recently enacted domestic partnership statute would be disclosed. The Court held
that disclosure of referendum petitions does not, as a general matter, violate the First Amend-
ment although as applied challenges to such laws could, in appropriate circumstances, succeed.
See Doe v. Reed, No. 09-559, Slip Op. at 2 (9th Cir. June 24, 2010).
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2. Post-Buckley Decisions
The Court had several opportunities to apply Buckley's holding that
reasonable restrictions on political contributions were justified on an-
ticorruption grounds. Two years after Buckley, the Court, in First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, held that a Massachusetts
prohibition on contributions and expenditures by certain business cor-
porations for the purposes of influencing or affecting the vote on ref-
erendums was unconstitutional. 10 The Court did not base its decision
on the grounds that the statute engaged in viewpoint discrimination
and instead rested its decision on the principle that corporations are
entitled to First Amendment liberties."' Despite the federal prohibi-
tion on corporate contributions dating back to the Tillman Act of
1907, the Court focused on the quid pro quo anticorruption rationale
set forth in Buckley and dismissed rationales based on shareholder
rights and the corruptive aggregations of corporate wealth.112
The Court found that restrictions involving referendums did not
have a close enough nexus to the regulation of quid pro quo corrup-
tion. The Court left open the possibility that a restriction on indepen-
dent corporate expenditures in support of an electoral candidate (as
opposed to referendum) could pass constitutional muster." 3 Justice
White pointedly argued that corporations, as artificial entities created
by law to further economic goals, were not entitled to protections af-
forded to individuals-a position that would echo loudly over thirty
years later in Citizens United.114
Three years later, the Court invalidated a Berkeley, California, or-
dinance that restricted contributions to committees formed to support
or oppose ballot measures submitted to popular vote."15 Again, the
Court failed to recognize the anticorruption justification for such re-
strictions, particularly because contributions of this sort were not
made to candidates.116
110. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
111. Id. at 784.
112. Id. at 789.
113. "[A] corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no compara-
ble right in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign for election to
public office." Id. at 788 n.26 (emphasis added). However, the Court, in Citizens United, dis-
pelled the notion that expenditures in an electoral context could be treated any differently from
the expenditures at issue in this case. See infra notes 280-363 and accompanying text.
114. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809-10 (White, J., dissenting). See infra notes 280-363 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Citizens United.
115. See generally Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
116. Id. at 298-99.
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The Court did uphold the contribution limitations imposed on do-
nors to PACs in California Medical Ass'n v. FEC."7 The Court held,
as it did in Buckley, that contribution limitations do not directly im-
pinge on the ability of contributors to air their political views.' 18 Be-
cause the PAC contribution limitation was necessary to prevent
donors from easily circumventing the limits on contributions to candi-
dates, it passed muster under Buckley's anticorruption rationale. 119
Likewise, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Court
upheld a Missouri law that limited contributions to candidates for
state office to amounts ranging from $275 to $1,075, depending on the
state office or the size of the constituency. 120 However, between the
time that Buckley and Nixon were decided, the composition of the
Court had changed markedly and dissenting voices questioned the
continued validity of Buckley's anticorruption rationale.121 In 2006,
these voices struck down a Vermont law imposing contribution limita-
tions ranging from $200 to $400, depending on the office in question,
on the ground that the limits were too restrictive. 122 Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion, stated his desire to
overturn Buckley,123 and Justice Kennedy appeared almost as eager to
do the same.124
Although the Court upheld the right of corporate contributions in
Bellotti, it did so in the context of a referendum. 125 In FEC v. Beau-
mont, the Court considered the issue of whether the ban on direct
corporate contributions was unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit
advocacy corporation. 126 Despite existing precedent that provided
special treatment for advocacy corporations with respect to expendi-
117. Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
118. See id. at 196.
119. Id. at 198.
120. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397-98 (2000).
121. Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion called for the reversal of Buckley. Id. at 409-10
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Thomas would regularly question the validity of
Buckley. See infra notes 123, 232 and accompanying text.
122. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006). The Court found several problems with the
statute's contribution limits, including the fact that it applied to both primaries and general elec-
tions and limited contributions from both individuals and political parties. Id. at 249. However,
the Court was most troubled by the extremely low contribution limit, which was not indexed for
inflation. Id. at 250. The low contribution limits, coupled with the infringement on political
association rights imposed by the limit on party contributions, proved fatal. Vermont failed to
show that its interest in preventing corruption was more urgent than similar interests of other
states. Id. at 251-53.
123. Id. at 265-66 (Thomas, J., concurring).
124. See id. at 264-65 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
126. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149-52 (2003).
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tures, the Court upheld the restrictions pursuant to Buckley's contri-
bution-expenditure dichotomy. 127
With respect to restrictions on political expenditures, the Court's
decisions were inconsistent and reflected the tension growing within
the Court about the Buckley contribution-expenditure dichotomy.
The Court provided conflicting guidance regarding limitations on di-
rect independent expenditures by corporations. In Bellotti, the Court
struck down restrictions on corporate expenditures intended to influ-
ence the outcome of a state referendum. 1 2 8 In FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL),'12 9 the Court decided whether the ban
on corporate political expenditures for express advocacy was unconsti-
tutional as applied to a small, nonprofit and nonstock corporation. 130
The corporation published and distributed a newsletter that detailed
the pro-life positions of every candidate for state or federal office in
Massachusetts. 131 The publication and distribution of the newsletter
were paid for with corporate funds.132
The Court held that the publication and distribution of the newslet-
ter constituted expenditures that met the express advocacy standard
set forth in Buckley and were therefore subject to statutory and FEC
regulation.133 Distinguishing between small, nonprofit corporations
and other corporations, the Court held that the prohibition on corpo-
rate expenditures, as applied to this corporation, was unconstitu-
tional.134  In the Court's opinion, the "[r]egulation of corporate
political activity" was not "about the use of the corporate form per se
... but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for politi-
cal purposes."135 Because Massachusetts Citizens for Life did not pose
such a threat, the state had no compelling justification for the expen-
diture restrictions.136 The FEC subsequently incorporated this deci-
sion in its regulations. The exception for so-called MCFL
corporations applied to corporations that were formed to promote po-
127. Id. at 162-63. See also infra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
129. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
130. Id. at 241.
131. Id. at 243-44.
132. The corporation could have established a PAC to make the expenditures in question.
However, the Court believed that the recordkeeping and reporting requirements and the neces-
sity to appoint a treasurer and custodian of the records imposed an administrative burden that
many small organizations would be unable to bear and that such requirements probably caused
many small entities to refrain from political activity. Id. at 254-55.
133. Id. at 249-50.
134. Id. at 258-59.
135. Id. at 259.
136. Id.
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litical ideas, had no shareholders or other persons with a claim to cor-
porate assets or earnings, and were not established by nor accepted
contributions from labor unions or business corporations.137
A few years earlier, in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee,138
the Court noted that restrictions on corporations and labor unions
may be justified to combat the large financial "war chests" that these
entities may amass.139 Moreover, the Court nodded approvingly to
the government's asserted interest in protecting investors and mem-
bers of an organization from a corporation's political views that such
investors or members might find disagreeable.140 The Court stated
that Congress may create a regulatory scheme that reflects the belief
that "the special characteristics of the corporate structure require par-
ticularly careful regulation."141 Although National Right to Work did
not deal with contributions or expenditures, it did reveal the Court's
position on corporate restrictions.1.42 MCFL did nothing to dispel this
position because it focused on a corporation's ability to aggregate
wealth but concluded that any dangers posed by such a possibility did
not exist in that case. 143
However, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court
upheld a Michigan law prohibiting the expenditure of general corpo-
rate funds in any election to state office as it applied to a nonprofit
corporation.144 The Court distinguished the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce from nonprofit advocacy groups such as MCFL.145
Whereas the membership of the latter groups were comprised of like-
minded individuals, the former's members were almost entirely for-
profit corporations.146 The Court relied on Buckley's anticorruption
rationale to justify the restriction and denied that the statute was in-
137. See Corporate and Labor Organization Expenditures, 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c) (2010). The
Supreme Court later held that this exception also applied to the ban on electioneering communi-
cations put in place by the McCain-Feingold Act. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
138. FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
139. Id. at 207.
140. Id. at 208.
141. Id. at 209-10.
142. This case dealt with the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(C), a provision that
restricted union solicitation of PAC contributions to union members. Nat'1 Right to Work
Comm., 459 U.S. at 198. FEC regulations defined "members" narrowly and the statute and
regulations were challenged as unduly burdensome of the union's First Amendment associa-
tional liberties. Id. at 203.
143. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986).
144. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990).
145. Id. at 664. The Court, in that case, created the MCFL corporation exception that was
later codified in regulations issued by the FEC. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259. See also supra note 137
and accompanying text.
146. Austin, 494 U.S. at 664.
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tended to equalize political voices-a rationale expressly deemed con-
stitutionally inadequate in Buckley.147 According to the Court, the
corporate power to aggregate wealth, made possible by advantages
granted by the state-created corporate form, had a corruptive effect
because corporate aggregation of wealth has "little or no correlation
to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."148
The Court's emphasis on the lack of correlation between a corpora-
tion's accumulation of wealth and public support for its political posi-
tions is curious because the same objection could be made to
independent expenditures by wealthy individuals such as Bill Gates,
Warren Buffet, or George Soros. The focus on the corporation as a
creature of state law echoed Justice White's dissent in Bellotti.149 In
fact, the Court's focus on corporate wealth appeared to single out cor-
porations per se for regulation, contrary to its prior statement in Bel-
lotti.1 5 0 This case became central to later reform debates and was
expressly overturned in Citizens United.51
The Court also appeared to extend Buckley's anticorruption ratio-
nale by upholding restrictions on coordinated expenditures by politi-
cal parties in support of party candidates. In FEC v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), the Court
noted that political parties and candidates invariably work together.152
The Court also found that coordinated expenditures were the "func-
tional equivalent" of contributions and thus should be evaluated
under the same standard of scrutiny as contribution limits in gen-
eral.153 In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC
(Colorado I), an earlier case involving the same organization, the
Court struck down restrictions on independent party expenditures.154
In that case, the Colorado Republican Party had run radio ads oppos-
ing its likely opponent in an upcoming race for the U.S. Senate at a
time in which the maximum expenditure allowed by law had already
been spent by the party.155 Colorado I centered on the categorization
147. See id. at 660. See also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
148. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
149. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
150. The Court distinguished corporations from labor unions by noting that unions "amass
large treasuries . . . without the significant state-conferred advantages of the corporate struc-
ture." Austin, 494 U.S. at 665. In Bellotti, the Court denied a state the ability to regulate corpo-
rate speech on the basis of the identity of the speaker. 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978).
151. See infra note 360 and accompanying text.
152. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431, 451-53
(2001).
153. Id. at 447, 456.
154. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado 1), 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996).
155. Id. at 612.
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of expenditures as either independent or coordinated. 156 In Colorado
II, a facial challenge to party expenditure limits, the government con-
tended that unless political party expenditures were presumed to be
coordinated with the candidate, the statutory contribution limits could
be easily avoided by funneling contributions to candidates through the
political parties. 57 Despite the difficulty in tying party expenditures
to corruption, the Court held that such expenditures may be limited
"to minimize circumvention of contribution limits" 15 8 and that the ne-
cessity to prevent disguised contributions was "a valid theory of cor-
ruption." 159 Buckley and the 1976 amendments to the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 made clear that coordinated expendi-
tures could be regulated as contributions. 160 Presumably, the Court's
reliance on the circumvention rationale was a response to the diffi-
culty of establishing a close enough nexus between political party con-
tributions and quid pro quo corruption-probably because it can be
assumed that a party's candidate holds political views closely aligned
with that of the party prior to the receipt of any contributions.
C. Effects of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
and Its Amendments
The campaign finance statutory regime put into place in the 1970s
ensconced political parties in an advantageous position relative to in-
dividuals, corporations, labor unions, and PACs. Individuals were lim-
ited to $1,000 contributions to candidates, 161 corporations and labor
unions could not donate directly to candidates at all,162 and PACs
could donate up to $5,000 to candidates.163 As a result of the 1974 and
1976 amendments to the Campaign Act, the limitations on donations
to political parties were more generous.164 Moreover, although politi-
cal parties were subject to the same direct contribution limitation as
156. See id. at 614-15, 618, 622-23.
157. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 446, 456, 477. Note that Buckley expressly provided for the
regulation of coordinated expenditures and the 1976 amendments to the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act amended the statute to include coordinated expenditures within the definition of con-
tributions. See supra notes 72, 106 and accompanying text.
158. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 465.
159. Id. at 456. Justice Thomas believed that the Court created an alternative theory of cor-
ruption quite apart from Buckley's quid pro quo corruption and that this alternative theory was
not justified. Id. at 477 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160. See supra notes 72, 106 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
162. An exception was created for so-called MCFL corporations. See supra note 137 and
accompanying text.
163. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 76, 85 and accompanying text.
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PACs, they enjoyed the unique ability to undertake coordinated ex-
penditures that were subject to less stringent restrictions.16 5
Coordinated expenditures dwarfed direct contributions by the polit-
ical parties during the 1990s.166 In addition, state party committees
could expend an unlimited amount of funds for certain "grass roots"
activities, such as voter registration and "get out the vote" efforts.167
After the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Colorado I, political par-
ties could also spend an unlimited amount on independent expendi-
tures. 168 However, despite a surge in independent expenditure
activity in the aftermath of the Court's decision, independent expendi-
tures never became a significant weapon in the parties' campaign arse-
nals. 169 They had a better weapon at their disposal: issue advocacy
funded by soft money.
Although the limits on political party expenditures were relatively
generous-and in the case of independent expenditures, unlimited-
expenditures for express advocacy activities had to be funded with
contributions raised within the confines of the statutory contribution
limitations (so-called hard money). As a result of the 1979 amend-
ments to the Campaign Act and favorable FEC decisions, state and
national parties were able to raise funds outside the strictures of the
statute to fund administrative costs allocable to non-federal activities,
despite the fact that party activities benefiting candidates for state or
local office also tend to benefit candidates for federal office. 170
The use of soft money grew during the 1980s but exploded during
the 1990s.171 One reason for this explosion was the increasing source
of well-heeled donors from which to solicit soft money contribu-
tions.172 Although the booming economy no doubt played a major
165. Coordinated expenditures are deemed contributions to the candidates and, consequently,
are subject to the stringent contribution limits. 1976 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112, 90
Stat. 475, 488 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(2006)). Therefore, individuals, corporations,
labor unions, and PACs are limited from undertaking coordinating activities in any meaningful
way. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Political party limitations are much more gener-
ous. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
166. Over the three election cycles between 1994 and 1998, direct Republican and Democratic
party donations to candidates totaled $14.7 million while both parties' combined coordinated
expenditures amounted to $129.4 million. See Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 626 (2000).
167. Coordination between state and national party committees allowed the state committees
to benefit from the national committee's fundraising apparatus. See id.
168. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
169. Briffault, supra note 166, at 627-28.
170. Id. at 629 (citing FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10 (Nov. 21, 1978) and FEC Advisory Op.
1979-17 (July 16, 1979)).
171. Briffault, supra note 166, at 629-31.
172. Id. at 631.
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factor in increasing the supply of wealthy donors, most soft money
came from corporate donors. 173 Perhaps more importantly, the politi-
cal parties found another use for soft money donations that had its
genesis in Buckley. As discussed previously, Buckley held that inde-
pendent expenditures could be regulated only if they resulted in ex-
press advocacy. 174 The Court then laid down the famous magic words
doctrine in defining what type of communication constituted express
advocacy. 75 Issue advocacy had been the domain of independent,
ideologically driven groups.176 However, in 1995 the FEC approved
the use of soft money for a Republican National Committee advertise-
ment that discussed issues but also criticized President Clinton by
name.177 Both the Republican and Democratic parties undertook
multi-million dollar issue advertising campaigns during the 1996 elec-
tion cycle.' 78
The Buckley decision opened the floodgates to soft money, and by
the mid to late 1990s, the parties exploited the opportunities
presented by the use of unregulated issue advocacy to an extent that
would soon set in motion major reforms.179 Although issue advocacy
had been unregulated since Buckley, independent groups had not
been a force in federal campaigns until the 1990s. The contrast be-
tween corporate soft money contributions to political parties and in-
dependent advocacy groups suggested that corporations-and
perhaps well-healed individuals as well-were more interested in the
access that such contributions could provide than in supporting partic-
ular ideologies. 180 However, the landscape would change in dramatic
fashion in the aftermath of the bitterly contested 2000 presidential
election.
The system of campaign finance regulation in place three decades
after the passage of the Campaign Act was one that could permissibly
regulate contributions, coordinated expenditures, and express advo-
cacy by corporations, labor unions, and political committees. It could
173. Id.
174. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
176. Briffault, supra note 166, at 632.
177. Id. (citing FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25 (1995)).
178. See id.
179. See Laura MacCleery, Goodbye Soft Money, Hello Grassroots: How Campaign Finance
Reform Restructured Campaigns and the Political World, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 965, 978-84
(2009), for a discussion of soft money fundraising during the 1990s.
180. A recent Republican National Committee fundraising strategy document indicated that
small donors, in general, are motivated by ideology but that large donors seek access. See Ben
Smith, Exclusive: RNC Document Mocks Donors, Plays on 'Fear,' PoLnIco.coM (Mar. 3, 2010),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0310/33866-Page2.html.
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require disclosure of political activity, but generally could not place
limitations on independent expenditures by iidividuals and political
committees, nor regulate non-advocacy expenditures. By the time of
the 2000 presidential election, the inability of the government to regu-
late non-advocacy expenditures resulted in an explosion of issue advo-
cacy by the political parties, funded principally by corporations and
wealthy individuals. Soft money had become the proverbial camel's
nose in the tent of campaign finance reform. To a casual observer of
the political scene, there appeared to be little distinction between an
issue ad and express advocacy communication. Moreover, despite al-
most a century since the passage of the Tillman Act, corporate partici-
pation in the political arena was extensive.
IV. THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002
(THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD ACT)
A. Statutory Provisions
The extensive use of soft money during the 2000 presidential elec-
tion, as well as revelations about unsavory campaign fundraising tac-
tics, created a wellspring of support for further reform that was
championed by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold. 181 The
McCain-Feingold Act182 represented the most significant legislative
change since the 1974 amendments to the Campaign Act.
The legislation banned soft money contributions to, and expendi-
tures by, political parties. Title I of the McCain-Feingold Act, enti-
tled "Reduction of Special Interest Influence,"- prohibited indirect
contributions made through national committees of political parties
and prohibited spending any funds that were not subject to hard
money statutory restrictions and reporting requirements.183 Similar
restrictions were placed on state, district, and local party committees
with respect to amounts that such committees expended for federal
election activities.184 Moreover, fundraising costs by national, state,
181. See, e.g., Don Van Natta, Jr. & Jill Abramson, In Justice Inquiry, Clinton Denies Seeking
Financial Help for Friend, N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 2000, at Al (reporting on allegations that a large
campaign contribution was pledged to President Clinton by an Indonesian businessman); Leslie
Wayne, Gore's Calls to Big Donors Number 86, Papers Show, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at A16
(reporting that Vice President Gore made fundraising calls from the White House).
182. McCain-Feingold Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
183. § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 82 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i (2006)). The prohibition applied to
any national committee, officers or agents acting on behalf of such committees, and any entities
that were directly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a national committee. Id.
184. Id. However, state and local committees of a political party were permitted to receive
what are known as "Levin Funds," donations up to $10,000 per year per donor that may be used
for certain purposes such as voter registration drives, voter identification initiatives, and get-out-
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district, and local committees were also subjected to the hard money
limitations and disclosure rules. 85 Political parties were restricted
from engaging in electioneering communications through the broad-
ened coordinated expenditure rules. 86 Title I of the Act also in-
creased the limitation on contributions to state political committees to
$10,000 and required enhanced disclosures from political
committees.187
Title II of the McCain-Feingold Act defined the term election-
eering communications as
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which-(I) refers
to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is made
within (aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for
the office sought by the candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary
or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party
that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by
the candidate; and (III) in the case of a communication which refers
to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President,
is targeted to the relevant electorate.'88
A communication is targeted at the relevant electorate if it can be
received by 50,000 or more persons in the congressional district or
state of a candidate for the House of Representatives or Senate, re-
spectively.189 Electioneering communications do not include news
stories, commentaries, or editorials distributed through the facilities of
a broadcast station not owned or controlled by a political party, candi-
date, or political committee. Nor do such communications include
candidate debates or forums, communication promoting such events,
or expenditures governed by the other provisions of the statute.190 In
the event that this statutory definition is held unconstitutional, then
the statute would narrow the definition to include only express advo-
cacy communications that are "suggestive of no plausible meaning
the-vote efforts. Id. Corporations and labor unions are permitted to donate such Levin Funds.
See 11 C.F.R. § 300.31(c) (2010).
185. § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 84 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(c)).
186. § 202, 116 Stat. at 90-91 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 434, 441a(a)(7)).
187. § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 84. See infra notes 188-99 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the restrictions on "electioneering communications." Such committees were also prohibited
from soliciting funds for, or directly donating funds to, any I.R.C. § 501(c) organization exempt
from tax pursuant to I.R.C. § 501(a) or any I.R.C. § 527 organization that was not a political
committee. McCain-Feingold Act, § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 84. See infra notes 259-74 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of I.R.C. § 527 organizations.
188. McCain-Feingold Act, § 201, 116 Stat. at 89 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)).
189. § 201, 116 Stat. at 90 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(C)).
190. § 201(f)(3)(B), 116 Stat. at 89-90 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(iii)). Also ex-
empted are communications pursuant to regulations promulgated by the FEC. § 201, 116 Stat. at
90 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(iv)).
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other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candi-
date." 191 The statute expressly rejected the necessity of the magic
words in order for a communication to fit within this narrower
definition.192
If a communication is an electioneering communication then the
McCain-Feingold Act subjects any person who contributed in excess
of $10,000 for the direct costs of producing and airing that communi-
cation to detailed reporting requirements. 193 The Act also amended
the coordinated expenditure rules to treat coordinated electioneering
communications as both contributions to the candidate and as expend-
itures by the candidate or the candidate's party.194 Finally, corpora-
tions and labor unions were prohibited from making electioneering
communications. 195 However, under the so-called Snowe-Jeffords
amendment, certain nonprofit civic corporations and IRC § 527 orga-
nizations are excluded from the prohibition, provided that the com-
munication in question is paid for exclusively by funds provided
directly by citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the United
States.196 With respect to civic associations that receive corporate or
union funding, the exemption only applies if the communication is
paid for out of a segregated account to which only the above-de-
scribed individuals can contribute.197 The Snowe-Jeffords amend-
ment, however, did not apply to television, radio, or cable
communications. 198 The Snowe-Jeffords amendment codified, to a
degree, the extension of the MCFL corporation exception to election-
eering communications.199
In addition, Title II imposed reporting requirements on indepen-
dent expenditures made between the twentieth day and the twenty-
four hours before an election if such expenditures, in the aggregate,
equal $1,000 or more.200 The statute defined an "independent expen-
191. § 201, 116 Stat. at 89 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii)).
192. The statute states, parenthetically, that a communication falls within the statutory defini-
tion "regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candi-
date." § 201, 116 Stat. at 89 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii)).
193. § 201(f), 116 Stat. at 88-89 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)).
194. § 202, 116 Stat. at 88-89 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)).
195. § 203, 116 Stat. at 91 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)).
196. § 203(c)(2), 116 Stat. at 91 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(2)).
197. § 203(c)(3)(B), 116 Stat. at 91-92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(3)(B)).
198. § 204, 116 Stat. at 92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(6)). This provision, the so-called
Wellstone Amendment, would substantially water down the MCFL corporation exception. See
supra note 137 and accompanying text for a discussion of the MCFL corporation exception.
However, the Supreme Court interpreted the Wellstone Amendment so as to retain the MCFL
corporation exception. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
200. § 212(g)(1)(A), 116 Stat. at 93 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(g)).
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diture" as an expenditure expressly advocating the election or defeat
of a clearly identified candidate that was not made in concert or coop-
eration with, or at the request or suggestion of a candidate, a candi-
date's authorized committee, their agents, or a political party or its
agents. 201 Moreover, the McCain-Feingold Act impeded the ability of
a political party to make both independent and coordinated expendi-
tures. No independent expenditures by a political party are permitted
once a political party has nominated a candidate and has made any
coordinated expenditures. 202 Additionally, no coordinated expendi-
tures by a political party are permitted after a political party has nomi-
nated a candidate if any independent expenditures have been made by
the party. 203
Title III of the McCain-Feingold Act placed certain restrictions on
candidates' use of campaign contributions, prohibited fundraising on
federal property, strengthened the ban on contributions and expendi-
tures by foreign nationals, and banned contributions by minors.204
The legislation also amended the "lowest unit charge" requirement
imposed on broadcast stations, eliminating this requirement for cer-
tain attack ads.205 Title III also increased the limitations for contribu-
tions to candidates from $1,000 to $2,000 and to national party
201. § 211, 116 Stat. at 92-93 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431).
202. § 213, 116 Stat. at 94 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(4)).
203. Id. The McCain-Feingold Act deems the expenditure of funds in coordination with a
political party committee as a contribution to such committee. § 214, 116 Stat. at 94 (codified at
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(ii)). It also repealed the existing FEC regulations concerning coordi-
nated expenditures and charged the FEC with promulgating new regulations that address spe-
cific criteria. § 214(b), 116 Stat. at 94-95 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a). The FEC has struggled
with the coordinated expenditure issue. In response to the district court decision in FEC v.
Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 92 (D.D.C. 1999), that specified when an expressive com-
munication is coordinated, the FEC issued regulations on coordinated expenditures. See Coor-
dinated General Public Political Communications, 11 C.F.R. § 100.23 (2001) (repealed 2002). It
was these regulations that were repealed by the statute. New regulations, pursuant to the stat-
ute, were issued in 2002 but a portion of the regulations was held invalid in Shays v. FEC, 337 F.
Supp. 2d 28, 30 (D.D.C. 2004), aff'd 414 F.3d 76, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Regulations issued in 2006
were also invalidated. See Shays v. FEC, 508 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2007), aff'd 528 F.3d 914
(D.C. Cir. 2008). One of the more contentious issues with respect to the FEC's efforts was its
restrained approach to internet communications. See generally Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Loop-
hole.com: How the FEC's Failure to Fully Regulate the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance
Law, 109 CoLum. L. REv. 1708 (2009). The FEC has recently issued proposed regulations on
coordinated expenditures. See generally Coordinated Communications, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,893
(Oct. 21, 2009). Under the proposed regulations, whether an expenditure is coordinated de-
pends on both the content of the message and the speaker's conduct in connection with such
message. Id.
204. McCain-Feingold Act, §§ 301-303, 318, 116 Stat. at 95-96, 109 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 439a, 441e, 441k; 18 U.S.C. § 607).
205. § 305, 116 Stat. at 100-02 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)).
2010] CITIZENS UNITED & CORP. POLITICAL SPEECH
committees from $20,000 to $25,000.206 Moreover, the limit was set at
$37,500 for contributions to candidates and their authorized commit-
tees and at $57,500 for overall contributions, provided no more than
$37,500 in contributions were made to political committees other than
national party committees.207 These limitations were also indexed for
inflation.208 Finally, the McCain-Feingold Act required clear identifi-
cation of the sponsors of election-related advertising, including the
now familiar phrase, "I approve of this ad," in radio and television
advertisements. 209
Perhaps the most controversial provision of Title III was the so-
called millionaires' amendment. Buckley precluded restricting a can-
didate from using personal or family funds in financing her cam-
paign.210 Congress believed that the inherent advantage enjoyed by
wealthy candidates would be exacerbated by the ban on soft money
imposed by the McCain-Feingold Act, and provisions were therefore
enacted to mitigate a wealthy candidate's funding advantages.211 The
millionaires' amendment is a complex provision, supported by de-
tailed rules relaxing contribution limits to a candidate depending on
the level of self-funding by the candidate's opponent.212 With respect
to Senate elections, for example, if the opposition expends personal
funds by an amount exceeding over twice a threshold amount, then
the individual contribution limit to the candidate is tripled.213 If such
excess expenditures by the opposition exceed four times a threshold
206. § 307, 116 Stat. at 102 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)).
207. § 307, 116 Stat. at 102-03 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)).
208. § 307, 116 Stat. at 103 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c)). The contribution limits for indi-
viduals for 2009-2010 are $2,400 and $30,400 for contributions to candidates and national party
committees, respectively. The aggregate limitations for the same periods are $45,600 and
$69,900 for contributions to candidates and overall contributions, respectively. See The FEC and
Federal Campaign Finance Law, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/pages/
brochures/fecfeca.shtml#ContributionLimits (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
209. § 311, 116 Stat. at 105-06 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441d). Radio and television advertise-
ments sponsored by persons other than the candidate or person authorized by the candidate
must contain a statement indicating who is responsible for the advertisement. § 311, 116 Stat. at
106 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2)).
210. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
211. See Michael J. Kesper, Magic Words and Millionaires: The Supreme Court's Assault on
Campaign Fundraising, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1. 16-18 (2008).
212. § 304, 116 Stat. at 97-100 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a).
213. § 304(a), 116 Stat. at 97 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(i)(1)(c)). In addition, the aggregate
contribution limitations are suspended. Id. (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(i)(1)(C)). The threshold
amount is an amount equal to $150,000 plus $.04 multiplied by the voting age population of the
state. Id. (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(i)(B)). Moreover, expenditures from personal funds are
deemed to include a portion of the opposition candidate's overall fundraising advantage-
termed the "gross receipts advantage." § 316, 116 Stat. at 108-09 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(i)(E)(ii)).
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amount, then the individual contribution limit is increased six-fold.214
A similar scheme, though operationally distinguishable from the
above-described provisions, was put into place for elections to the
House of Representatives. 2 1 5
Titles IV and V of the McCain-Feingold Act provided for the direct
appeal to the Supreme Court on an expedited basis of any district
court decision concerning declarative or injunctive relief from the Mc-
Cain-Feingold Act on constitutional grounds. 216 These titles also
gave standing to members of Congress to intervene in a lawsuit 217 and
mandated that reports be made accessible on the Internet. 218
B. Judicial Developments
1. McConnell v. FEC
Predictably, the McCain-Feingold Act was quickly challenged and
the Supreme Court rendered a decision in McConnell v. FEC less than
two years after the passage of the legislation under the statute's expe-
dited appeal provision.219 A bitterly divided Court upheld the legisla-
tion virtually in its entirety.220  The Court approved the
McCain-Feingold Act's restrictions on soft money. In doing so, it ap-
peared to relax the nexus required by Buckley between contributions
and corruption or the appearance of corruption. The Court stated,
"[T]he Government's strong interests in preventing corruption, and in
particular the appearance of corruption, [were] thus sufficient to jus-
214. § 304, Stat. 116 at 97 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(i)(C)(ii)). If the expenditures exceed
ten times the threshold amount, then, in addition to the six-fold increase in the contribution
limitations, the state and national party committee spending limitations do not apply. § 304, 116
Stat. at 98 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(i)(C)(iii)).
215. For House of Representatives elections the threshold amount is $350,000. If a party ex-
ceeds that amount the contribution limits are tripled for his opponent, and the party committee
expenditure limitations do not apply. § 319, 116 Stat. at 109 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1).
216. § 403(a), 116 Stat. at 113-114.
217. § 403(b), 116 Stat. at 114.
218. § 501-502, 116 Stat. at 114-15 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(11)(B)).
219. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
220. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer formed the majority. Id. at
114. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy all dissented from sig-
nificant portions of the majority opinion. Id. at 247, 264, 286, 350. The constitutionality of the
millionaires' amendment, discussed supra at notes 212-15 and accompanying text, was not de-
cided by the Court in McConnell. See id. at 229-30. Senator Mitch McConnell, the lead plaintiff
and an incumbent, did not challenge this provision. Id. at 114 n.1 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 251
F. Supp. 2d 176, 221-26 (D.D.C. 2003)). It was challenged by a group of other plaintiffs but the
Court dismissed their challenge for lack of standing. Id. at 229-30.
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tify subjecting all donations to national parties" to the statutory limi-
tation and disclosure rules. 221 As one scholar noted,
In sustaining the soft money ban, McConnell relied principally on
several post-Buckley cases that had interpreted Buckley's "lesser
scrutiny" for contribution limitations to dictate virtually no judicial
scrutiny of them at all. If Buckley could be thought to have rested
on an implicit premise of distrust of legislative judgment regarding
restrictions that "operated in an area of the most fundamental First
Amendment freedoms," McConnell replaced it with an explicit pre-
mise of deference to legislatures. In addition . . . the McConnell
majority thoroughly repudiated Buckley's narrow definition of cor-
ruption as quid pro quos between contributors and candidates....
Indeed, the Court went so far as to announce that soft-money con-
tributions could be regulated "[e]ven if . . . access did not secure
actual influence, [because] it certainly gave the appearance of such
influence." 222
The Court also upheld the corporate and union ban on election-
eering communications. In doing so, the Court found that the statu-
tory definition of such communications was "both easily understood
and objectively determinable." 2 2 3 More importantly, the Court re-
jected the notion that Buckley's magic words were a constitutional
threshold in order for communication restrictions to pass First
Amendment scrutiny. In fact, the Court expanded Buckley's defini-
tion of express advocacy by stating that "issue ads broadcast during
the thirty- and sixty-day periods preceding federal primary and gen-
eral elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy." 224
According to the Court, Buckley had not "suggested that a statute
that was neither vague nor overbroad would be required to toe the
same express advocacy line." 225 The Court, interpreting Buckley's
magic words as a corrective measure to deal with vagueness con-
cerns, 226 found that the statutory definition raised no such concerns.227
221. Id. at 156. The restrictions on soft money were subsequently challenged in the wake of
the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United but were upheld by the District Court for the
District of Columbia and affirmed, without opinion, by the Supreme Court. See infra note 366
and accompanying text.
222. Lillian R. BeVier, First Amendment Basics Redux: Buckley v. Valeo to FEC v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, 2005-07 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 77, 82 (alterations in original) (quoting McConnell,
540 U.S. at 153).
223. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194. The Court did interpret the statute to retain the MCFL
corporation exception despite the language of the Wellstone Amendment, which on its face ap-
peared to negate the MCFL corporation exception for television, radio, cable, and satellite tele-
vision communications. Id. at 211. See supra note 198 for a discussion of the Wellstone
Amendment.
224. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
225. Id. at 192.
226. Id.
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Deferring to "the legislative judgment that the special characteristics
of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation," the
Court upheld the statute. 228 In doing so, the Court dismissed the ar-
gument that the prohibition on corporate and union electioneering
was overbroad and would prohibit bona fide issue ads.229 According
t.o the Court, the statute did not result in an excessive suppression of
speech because corporations and unions remained free to speak
outside the thirty- and sixty-day statutory windows or could fund
speech through segregated funds.230
Thus McConnell knocked Buckley's magic words doctrine off the
constitutional pedestal, loosened the nexus required between contri-
butions and corruption, expanded the definition of express advocacy,
exhibited a new deference to the legislature, and adopted the Austin
Court's amenability to corporate speech regulation.231 Moreover, its
deferential approach toward congressional findings belied the applica-
tion of the strict scrutiny called for in Buckley. Justice Scalia's scath-
ing dissent was a harbinger of the future judicial antipathy toward
McConnell that would find a voice in three subsequent cases, includ-
ing Citizens United:
This is a sad day for freedom of speech. Who could have
imagined that the same Court which, within the past four years, has
sternly disapproved of restrictions upon such inconsequential forms
of expression as virtual child pornography, tobacco advertising, dis-
semination of illegally intercepted communications, and sexually ex-
plicit cable programming, would smile with favor upon a law that
cuts to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect:
the right to criticize the government. 232
2. Post-McConnell Decisions
The ban on corporate electioneering communications was tested
again in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 2 33 However, by this time
the composition of the Court had changed with the additions of Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Wisconsin Right to Life, a non-
profit advocacy corporation, wanted to run advertisements paid for by
general corporate funds that criticized the filibusters by Senate Demo-
227. Id. at 194.
228. Id. at 192, 205 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003)).
229. Id. at 204-06.
230. Id. at 204. See supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of election-
eering communications.
231. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
232. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
233. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
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crats of some of President George W. Bush's judicial nominees.234
The ads would have run afoul of the electioneering communications
restrictions because they would be aired within thirty days of the 2004
Wisconsin primary and mention Senator Feingold by name.235 The ads
would contain none of the so-called magic words of express advo-
cacy.2 3 6 The district court held on procedural grounds that McConnell
precluded the corporation's as applied challenge to the statute.237 The
Supreme Court unanimously vacated the judgment and remanded the
case to the district court for consideration on the merits, and the dis-
trict court then sustained the challenge. 238
The Court, now affirming the district court, made clear that the ban
on corporate electioneering communications was subject to strict scru-
tiny, citing New York Times v. Sullivan for the proposition that "de-
bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open." 2 3 9 The Court rejected the assertion that McConnell estab-
lished an intent-based standard for testing whether such communica-
tions were the functional equivalent of express advocacy because such
a standard "would chill core political speech." 240 Instead, the Court
put forth an objective standard that equated an ad with express advo-
cacy only if the ad was "susceptible of no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." 241
The Court, in finding that the ad in question did not meet this test,
placed significant emphasis on the fact that the ad did not mention an
election, candidate, party, or challenger. 242 The Court was particu-
larly dismissive of the FEC's position stating that the Commission
was, in essence, advocating the "perverse" position that "there can be
no such thing as a genuine issue ad during the blackout period."243
Having determined that the ad in question did not amount to ex-
press advocacy, the Court proceeded to determine whether the gov-
ernment had a compelling government interest that would sustain the
regulation. The Court firmly rejected the position that the restriction
was valid as a means of rooting out "the corrosive and distorting ef-
234. Id. at 458-59.
235. Id. at 459.
236. Id. at 458-59.
237. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04-1260, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29036, at *6 (D.D.C.
Aug. 17, 2004).
238. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (per curiam); Wis. Right to Life,
Inc. v. FEC, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 210 (D.D.C. 2006).
239. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 467-68 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)).
240. Id. at 468.
241. Id. at 470.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 471-72.
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fects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form." 2 4 4 The Court cited Bellotti in refusing to
strip corporations of their First Amendment rights.245 Although this
case did not present a facial challenge to the statute, its holding called
into question the continuing vitality of McConnell.246 Unlike in Mc-
Connell, the Wisconsin Right to Life Court showed no deference to
the legislative findings. In promulgating an objective test for the func-
tional equivalency of express advocacy, the Court also made clear that
the distinction between issue and express advocacy first set forth in
Buckley remained valid.2 4 7 Moreover, the Court's approving nod to
Bellotti and its refusal to create an MCFL corporation-type exception
to the statute spoke volumes about the majority's predilections re-
garding per se corporate restrictions on political speech.2 48
In McConnell, the Court dismissed a challenge to the constitutional-
ity of the McCain-Feingold Act's millionaires' amendment for lack of
standing.249 In 2008, the Court had another occasion to examine this
provision in Davis v. FEC.2 5 0 In another 5-4 decision, the Court in-
validated the provision and held that it imposed an unjustifiable bur-
den on First Amendment liberties.251 Despite the fact that this
provision did not impose the type of expenditure limits that the Court
struck down in Buckley, the Court believed that the millionaires'
amendment imposed an "unprecedented penalty on any candidate
who robustly exercises [his] First Amendment right." 252 By forcing a
candidate to choose between "unfettered political speech" and "dis-
criminatory fundraising limitations," the statute created a "drag" on
the speech rights of the candidate.253 The Court further noted that the
anticorruption justification for the provision, required by Buckley, did
244. Id. at 479-80 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Austin.
245. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 478 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
776-77 (1978)). See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bellotti.
246. Justice Scalia's concurrence, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, however, made
clear that he preferred to overrule McConnell and that he did not join the majority opinion for
this reason. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 499-504 (Scalia, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 467-70.
248. See supra note 137 and accompanying text for a discussion of the MCFL corporation
exception.
249. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the millionaires'
amendment.
250. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
251. Id. at 2772-73. Justice Alito wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 2764-65.
252. Id. at 2771.
253. Id. at 2771-72.
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not exist.254 In fact, the provision's statutory scheme actually belied
an anticorruption rationale, because its remedy for excessive cam-
paign money was to allow more campaign money in the form of
greater direct contributions to the opposing candidate-the very form
of financing that Buckley did allow to be regulated due to its potential
for quid pro quo corruption. 255
The Court squarely rejected any justification relating to the notion
that the provision leveled the playing field for candidates without a
great degree of personal wealth. The Court cited Buckley for the pro-
position that "[t]he ancillary interest in equalizing the . . . financial
resources of candidates"' cannot justify such restrictions.256 Justice
Alito, writing for the majority, made clear the Court's aversion to any
restrictions not firmly grounded in an anticorruption rationale and in-
dicated the Court's unwillingness to defer to Congress on this issue:
Different candidates have different strengths. Some are wealthy;
others have wealthy supporters who are willing to make large con-
tributions. Some are celebrities; some have the benefit of a well-
known family name. Leveling electoral opportunities means mak-
ing and implementing judgments about which strengths should be
permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election. The Consti-
tution, however, confers upon voters, not Congress, the power to
choose the Members of the House of Representatives, Art. I, § 2,
and it is a dangerous business for Congress to use the election laws
to influence the voters' choices. 257
Davis reinforced the Court's insistence on a close nexus between
the government restrictions sought and their contribution to combat-
ing quid pro quo corruption. Arguably, the millionaires' amendment
did not inhibit the ability of a candidate to speak. A wealthy candi-
date could spend any amount of personal funds she desired. The fact
that her opponent could then take advantage of increased funding
limits seems to place minimal burdens on the wealthy candidate.
Ironically, allowing the opposing candidate to raise greater funds
would appear to encourage more speech. However, the Court was not
willing to countenance this type of restriction if its rationale was
rooted in an attempt to equalize electoral opportunities. Davis also
highlighted the continued hostility of the Court's majority toward
254. Id. at 2773.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 2771 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976)).
257. Id. at 2774. The Ninth Circuit recently upheld the constitutionality of a similar matching
fund scheme under Arizona law. See McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010). How-
ever, the Supreme Court stayed the Ninth Circuit's mandate. See McComish v. Bennett, 130 S.
Ct. 3408 (2010) (order vacating the stay of the District Court's injunction and staying the man-
date of the Ninth Circuit).
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campaign finance regulation in general. This hostility, pointedly ex-
pressed by Justice Thomas in McConnell when he referred to the Mc-
Cain-Feingold Act as "the most significant abridgment of the
freedoms of speech and association since the Civil War,"258 would
soon have another outlet for its expression. This time, however, the
Court would deal more squarely with McConnell.
C. Effects of the McCain-Feingold Act
The success that the McCain-Feingold Act had in rooting out the
use of soft money by political parties had several effects on campaign
finance practices. Section 527 organizations became increasingly
prominent participants in the political process. These tax-exempt or-
ganizations, named after the IRC section that defines and regulates
them, can be parties, committees, associations, funds, or other incor-
porated or unincorporated entities that are organized and operated
for the purpose of accepting contributions and making expenditures
for a statutbrily defined exempt function.259 An exempt function is
one that influences or attempts to influence "the selection, nomina-
tion, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State,
or local public office or office in a political organization, or the elec-
tion of Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors. . . ."260 Section 527
governs the taxation of political organizations and includes within its
ambit political parties and other committees that are subject to the
statutory campaign finance rules.261
258. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,264 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
259. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (2006). Other tax-exempt organizations can also engage in political
activity to a limited degree. Section 501(c)(3) organizations, which include the prototypical char-
itable, religious, and educational institutions, risk losing their tax exemption if they engage in
substantial electoral or lobbying activities or participate in campaigns. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3),
501(h). Unlike other tax-exempt organizations, donations to these entities are deductible by the
donor as a charitable contribution. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B). Section 501(c)(4) social welfare
organizations, Section 501(c)(5) labor unions, and Section 501(c)(6) trade associations have
greater latitude to engage in electoral activities, but these activities cannot constitute their pri-
mary purpose. See Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next
"Loophole?," 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REv. 41, 52-53 (2007). Section 501(c)(6) trade organiza-
tions have been used as a vehicle to fund issue ads favorable to corporate interests. See Shayla
Kasel, Note, Show Us Your Money: Halting the Use of Trade Organizations as Covert Conduits
for Corporate Campaign Contributions, 33 J. CORP. L. 297, 314-17 (2007) (noting that Microsoft
contributed over $250,000 to trade organizations to fund issue ads). See also Jim Rutenberg et
al., Offering Donors Secrecy, and Going on Attack, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2010, at Al. One com-
mentator has discussed the possibility that taxable entities may become the vehicle of choice for
conducting campaign activities. See Tobin, supra, at 259.
260. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2).
261. § 527(c)(1). In general, political organizations are subject to tax on their taxable income
at corporate income tax rates. § 527(b). However, excluded from taxable income is "exempt
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The definition of an exempt function for purposes of Section 527
would seem to place such organizations squarely within the definition
of a political committee as defined under the campaign finance stat-
utes. 262 However, the IRS took an expansive view of activities meant
to influence "the selection, nomination, election, or appointment" of
any covered individual.263 Many such activities do not amount to ex-
press advocacy and, accordingly, are outside the scope of the cam-
paign finance rules. The tax law "encompasses activities that, directly
or indirectly, relate to and support any aspect of the process of influ-
encing or attempting to influence" the electoral process. 264 After
Buckley, only political organizations that engage in express advocacy
or that coordinate their activities with a candidate, candidate's com-
mittee, or political party are subject to FEC regulation. 265 Since 2000,
all Section 527 organizations have been subject to disclosure require-
ments administered by the IRS that are similar to those under the
campaign finance rules administered by the FEC.266
, The ban on soft money imposed by the McCain-Feingold Act re-
sulted in the heightened importance of unregulated Section 527 orga-
nizations engaged in issue advocacy. In contrast to political party soft
money sources, these organizations are funded primarily by large con-
function income," which includes contributions, membership dues and fees for political organiza-
tions, and fundraising proceeds. § 527(c)(3). No deduction is allowed for political expenditures.
See § 162(e)(1). Moreover, dues paid to tax-exempt organizations, such as trade associations,
that are allocable to such activities are similarly non-deductible. § 162(e)(3). Deductions for
certain indirect contributions to political parties, such as advertising in convention programs and
other publications and admission costs to dinners and inaugural events are also not deductible.
§ 276(a). Section 527 was enacted in 1975 to provide an element of certainty to the taxation of
political organizations. Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-625, §10, 88 Stat. 2018, 2116-19. Prior
to the enactment of I.R.C. § 527, the tax treatment of contributions was governed by IRS rulings.
See Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem .. . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
949, 955 (2005).
262. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. However, a recent decision by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck down the limitations on contributions to
political committees that engage in independent advocacy. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d
686, 695-96 (D.C. Cir. 2010). That case involved a Section 527 organization. See infra note 364
and accompanying text.
263. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2). Costs incurred to aid a person in exploring whether to run for office,
costs related to issue advocacy, and costs incurred between elections and prior to the existence of
a named candidate are examples of exempt function expenditures that would not be governed by
the campaign finance rules. See Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifi-
cations for Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEo. L.J. 1181, 1190-93
(2007).
264. Galston, supra note 263, at 1192.
265. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. After the passage of the Mc-
Cain-Feingold Act, political organizations that engage in electioneering communications would
also be subject to FEC regulation. See supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
266. I.R.C. § 527(j). The disclosure rules were added by Act of July 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
230, § 2(a), 114 Stat. 477, 479 (2000).
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tributions from individuals. 267 Corporations, perhaps uncertain about
the legal status of these entities and finding them too remote from the
candidates to provide access, generally avoided these organizations. 268
Democrats were quicker to utilize Section 527 organizations due to
the perceived advantages enjoyed by the Republicans in raising hard
money.269 A network of Section 527 organizations developed inde-
pendent of the national party and with the aid of large contributions
from wealthy individuals such as George Soros.270 However, by the
2004 presidential campaign season, Republicans had embraced Sec-
tion 527 organizations with alacrity.
The 2004 presidential election represented the pinnacle of Section
527 organizations' influence-most likely due to the.visceral reaction
by liberals to President George W. Bush and conservatives' counter-
reaction. Approximately $233 million was raised by Section 527
groups for federal election activities in 2004, of which approximately
$175 million was related to the presidential election.271 Although
these groups could not coordinate with the campaigns, a great deal of
informal communication developed between the groups and key party
operatives, including former President Clinton, the chair of the Re-
publican National Committee, and the director of the Bush
campaign.272
The increasing influence of these organizations led to various legis-
lative and administrative attempts to subject Section 527 groups to
regulation. These attempts approached the issue from different an-
gles, including requiring all such groups to register with the FEC, lib-
eralizing political party fundraising ability, and tightening the
coordination rules. 273 The reform proposals died. 274 However, by the
2008 presidential election, both political parties had reduced their reli-
ance on Section 527 groups and focused their efforts on raising hard
money.
267. See Johnston, supra note 106, at 1180-81.
268. Id. at 1181.
269. Id. at 1182.
270. Id. at 1183.
271. Id. at 1182-83. Two commentators estimated overall 527 organization spending during
the 2004 presidential election to be in excess of $440 million. See Ellen L. Weintraub & Jason K.
Levine, Campaign Finance and the 2008 Elections: How Small Change(s) Can Really Add up, 24
ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 461, 467 (2009) (citing figures provided by OpenSecrets.org).
272. Johnston, supra note 106, at 1184-85.
273. See Ronald Hrebenar et al., The Struggle to Regulate the 527s: Through the FEC, Con-
gress and the Courts, 12 NEXUS 97, 108-13 (2007).
274. Id. See also supra note 203 for a discussion of the FEC's struggle to issue coordinated
expenditure regulations.
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There were several reasons that the political parties discovered a
new-found appreciation for hard money. First, the McCain-Feingold
Act increased the contribution limitations on donations to campaigns
and political parties.275 The candidates and their political parties were
able to exploit the increased contribution limits through the adept use
of bundlers.276 Second, the elimination of soft money forced the par-
ties to focus on grassroots fundraising activities. 277 Third, Howard
Dean's success in utilizing the internet as a tool for raising small, hard
money donations during the Democratic primaries caught the atten-
tion of party operatives and resulted in the growth of Internet-based
fundraising-a tool used to great effect by then-Senator Obama's
campaign in 2008.278 Finally, although attempts at formally regulating
Section 527 organizations failed, the FEC aggressively mounted case-
by-case challenges to the practices of several Section 527 groups and
thereby chilled the enthusiasm for the use of such groups as vehicles
for political activity.279
V. CiTIzENs UNITED v. FEC
In January 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation with an
annual budget of approximately $12 million, released a film entitled
Hillary: The Movie.280 The film, a ninety-minute documentary, men-
tioned then-Senator Hillary Clinton by name and was extremely criti-
cal of her.281 At that time, Senator Clinton was a candidate in the
Democratic Party's presidential primary elections. 28 2 Citizens United
financed its operations primarily with donations from individuals, but
it also received a small portion of its funding from for-profit corpora-
tions.283 The film was released in theaters and on DVD, and in De-
cember 2007, a cable operator offered to make the film available to its
subscribers free of charge on its video-on-demand channel.284 Citi-
275. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
276. Bundlers are individuals who are identified with the campaign that collect individual do-
nations. During the 2008 presidential campaign, then-Senator Obama raised $750 million from
605 bundlers and Senator McCain raised $375.5 million from 851 bundlers. MacCleery, supra
note 179, at 1003-04 (citing the results of an investigation reported by Public Citizen).
277. See id. at 970, 994.
278. Id. at 995-99. See also Butrymowicz, supra note 203, at 1708 n.3.
279. See Weintraub & Levine, supra note 271, at 467-68 (noting that, after the 2004 elections,
the FEC imposed over $3 million in fines against a number of Section 527 organizations).
280. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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zens United also prepared three ads that it intended to run on broad-
cast and cable television to promote the film. 285
Due to the fact that the film would, according to its plan, be availa-
ble through the video-on-demand service within thirty days of the
2008 primary elections, Citizens United feared that it would run afoul
of § 441b of the McCain-Feingold Act's ban on corporate election-
eering communications.286 The corporation sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the FEC, arguing that § 441b was unconstitu-
tional as applied to the film and that the disclaimer and disclosure
requirements of the 2002 legislation were unconstitutional as applied
to the film and the three ads.287 The district court denied injunctive
relief and granted the FEC's motion for summary judgment. 288 The
court, citing McConnell, held that § 441b was constitutional on its face
and also as applied to the film.28 9 The court also upheld the dis-
claimer and disclosure requirements of the legislation.290
Surprisingly, in June 2009, the Supreme Court directed the parties
to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the Court should over-
rule Austin, the part of McConnell that upheld the facial validity of
§ 441b, or both.291
A. As Applied Challenges
The Court, before proceeding to the continuing validity of Austin
and the facial constitutionality of the statute, addressed the as applied
claims brought by Citizens United. Four such claims were brought,
and the Court rejected them all in a 5-4 decision.292
285. Id.
286. See supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the statutory
provision in question.
287. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888; Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275-76
(D.D.C. 2008) (per curiam).
288. See id. at 275.
289. Id. at 279.
290. Id. at 281.
291. Citizens United, 129 S. Ct. at 2893. The Court noted probable jurisdiction under the
statute's provision for a direct appeal of the district court's decision. See supra note 216 and
accompanying text.
292. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886. Chief
Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, concurred and wrote separately to discuss the issue of
stare decisis. Id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito and by
Justice Thomas in part, concurred and wrote separately to address the dissent's view of First
Amendment rights. Id. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion
concurring in all of the majority opinion except the part of the opinion that upheld the statute's
disclaimer and disclosure requirements. Id. at 979-82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Justice Thomas argued that those requirements were also unconstitutional. Id.
at 979-80. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, dissented to all
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First, Citizens United claimed that § 441b was inapplicable to the
film because the film did not qualify as an electioneering communica-
tion under the statute.293 The corporation argued that, because video-
on-demand transmissions are delivered only to a requesting cable con-
verter box, each transmission could be viewed by only one household,
an amount falling far short of the statutorily required 50,000-person
audience. 294 The Court rejected the corporation's argument, noting
that FEC regulations clearly provided that the number of people who
can receive a cable transmission is to be determined by the number of
cable subscribers in the relevant area-in this case, 34.5 million.295
One amici brief argued, alternatively, that the question of whether the
communication reaches 50,000 people should depend on the number
of voters who will likely view it.296 The Court also rejected that argu-
ment on the grounds that such a statutory interpretation would not
cure the constitutional defect, because it would subject the speaker to
sanctions as a result of inaccurate estimates and also cause her to in-
cur burdensome expenses in challenging such estimates. 297
Second, Citizens United asserted that § 441b could not be applied
to the film because, under Wisconsin Right to Life, the film was not
the functional equivalent of express advocacy. 298 Wisconsin Right to
Life had sustained an as applied challenge to § 441b and defined the
functional equivalent of express advocacy as a communication that "is
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to
vote for or against a specific candidate." 299 The Court found that the
film, highly critical of then-Senator Clinton, was susceptible to no rea-
sonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote against her.300
Third, Citizens United contended that the corporate ban on elec-
tioneering communications should be held invalid as applied to films
distributed by video-on-demand services.30 The corporation asserted
that video-on-demand requires the viewer to take a series of affirma-
tive steps in order to view a program.302 In contrast, television view-
of the majority opinion except the portion of the opinion that upheld the statute's disclaimer and
disclosure requirements. See id. at 929-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
293. Id. at 888.
294. Id. at 888-89.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 889.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 889-90 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007)). See
supra notes 233-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wisconsin Right to Life.
300. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 890.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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ers subjected to political ads do not affirmatively choose to watch the
political ad in question.303 The Court rejected this argument stating,
[A]ny effort by the judiciary to decide which means of communica-
tions are to be preferred for the particular type of message and
speaker would raise questions as to courts' own lawful authority....
... We must decline to draw, and then redraw, constitutional lines
based on the particular media or technology used to disseminate
political speech from a particular speaker. . . . The interpretive pro-
cess itself would create an inevitable, pervasive, and serious risk of
chilling protected speech pending the drawing of fine distinctions
that, in the end, would themselves be questionable. 304
Finally, Citizens United asked the Court to create an exception to
the application of § 441b to a nonprofit corporation that engages in
political speech and is funded overwhelmingly by donations from indi-
viduals.305 The Court had created the MCFL exception for corporate
advocacy prior to the enactment of the McCain-Feingold Act. 3 0 6 The
exception applied to nonprofit corporations-formed for the purpose
of promoting political ideas-that neither engaged in business activi-
ties nor accepted contributions from for-profit corporations or labor
unions. 307 This exception was incorporated into regulations subse-
quently issued by the FEC.3 08 The Snowe-Jeffords Amendment in-
corporated a version of the MCFL exception for electioneering
communications into § 441b, but the Wellstone Amendment eviscer-
ated the exception for radio, cable, and satellite television communi-
cations.309 Subsequently, McConnell interpreted the Wellstone
Amendment to retain the MCFL exception for electioneering
communications. 310
The Court held that Citizens United qualified for neither the MCFL
exception nor the exception carved out by the Snowe-Jeffords
Amendment because both exceptions prohibited any for-profit corpo-
rate funding. 311 Citizens United did receive a modest amount of such
303. Id.
304. Id. at 890-91.
305. Id. at 891.
306. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986). See also supra note 137
and accompanying text.
307. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259. See also supra note 137 and accompanying text.
308. Corporate and Labor Expenditures, 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c) (2010). See also supra note
137 and accompanying text.
309. McCain-Feingold Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 204, 116 Stat. 81, 92 (2002) (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 441b(c)(6) (2006)). See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of
these provisions.
310. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 211 (2003).
311. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 891 (2010).
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funding.312 Moreover, the Court refused to create a de minimis excep-
tion to the MCFL exception for two reasons. First, any de minimis
exception that allowed funding from for-profit corporations would al-
low for-profit corporate general treasury funds to be used for inde-
pendent express advocacy and, in the Court's opinion, there was no
principled basis for doing this "without rewriting Austin's holding. "313
Second, any de minimis standard would require case-by-case determi-
nations to be made and would chill political speech.314
B. Facial Validity of Corporate Political Speech Bans
Having rejected all four as applied challenges and, concomitantly,
having failed to decide the case on narrow grounds, the Court turned
its attention to Austin and the facial validity of § 441b.3 1 5 The Court
termed § 441b an "outright ban" on corporate political speech but-
tressed by criminal sanctions.316 The fact that a PAC created by a cor-
poration could speak to political issues did not soften the Court's
position.317 The Court found that a PAC is a separate and distinct
entity from the sponsoring corporation.318 Moreover, the Court held
that a PAC is burdened by administrative responsibilities and exten-
sive regulatory mandates-facts that, according to the Court, might
explain why there are fewer than 2,000 corporate PACs.319 In addi-
tion, the time required to establish a PAC may preclude a corporation
from establishing one in time to make its views known in a current
campaign. 320 The Court maintained that political speech has a promi-
nent perch in First Amendment jurisprudence, stating that "[t]he First
Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech ut-
tered during a campaign for political office." 321 Accordingly, "[f]aws
that burden political speech are 'subject to strict scrutiny,' which re-
312. Id. at 887, 891.
313. Id. at 891-92.
314. Id. at 892.
315. Citizens United stipulated to dismissing the part of its complaint that challenged the fa-
cial validity of the statute. Id. at 892. The Government argued that by doing so Citizens United
waived its challenge to Austin. Id. The Court responded with a fairly lengthy discussion that
explained why the waiver of a facial challenge did not preclude the Court from reconsidering
Austin or addressing the facial validity of the statute. See id. at 892-96.
316. Id. at 897.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 898.
321. Id. (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)).
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quires the Government to prove that the restriction 'furthers a com-
pelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."' 322
The Court then turned its attention to whether corporations could
be targeted by speech restrictions. Speech restrictions that are aimed
at particular speakers are suspect because they not only deprive the
speaker of a voice but also "deprive the public of the right and privi-
lege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration." 323 The Court distinguished the restriction in question
from speech restrictions aimed at particular persons that previously
had been upheld on the grounds that the permitted restrictions were
necessary to the operation of particular government functions. 324 The
Court cited numerous cases, including Bellotti, that extended First
Amendment liberties in general and specifically to corporations in the
political context.325 Justice Stevens's lengthy dissent disputed, largely
on historical grounds, the notion that corporations are entitled to First
Amendment protections as great as those afforded to regular per-
sons.326 Justice Scalia had a radically different view of the historical
record.327
Although corporate expenditure restrictions were put into place in
1947, their constitutional validity remained untested until Buckley.328
In the Court's opinion, Buckley was the earliest precedent that denied
the imposition of corporate expenditure restrictions.329 The Court
noted that although Buckley invalidated a separate ban on indepen-
dent expenditures, the provision at issue in that case also applied to
corporations. 330 Moreover, Buckley in no way suggested that the re-
striction in question was struck down by the invocation of the over-
breadth doctrine-that is, had the restriction applied only to
corporations, the constitutional infirmity would still not have been
cured.331 Moreover, the Court took a broad view of the Bellotti hold-
322. Id. (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
323. Id. at 899.
324. Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (dealing with
speech restrictions in public schools); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119,
129 (1977) (dealing with speech restrictions in correctional institutions); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 759 (1974) (dealing with speech restrictions in the military); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557 (1973) (dealing with speech restrictions with respect to civil service
employees)).
325. Id. at 899-900.
326. See id. at 948-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
327. See id. at 925-29 (Scalia, J., concurring).
328. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
329. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 901-02 (majority opinion).
330. Id. at 902.
331. Id.
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ing. Despite the fact that Bellotti struck down corporate expenditure
restrictions in the context of a referendum, the Court stated that its
holding would have been similar had the law imposed restrictions on
electoral activities. 332
According to the majority, corporations are entitled to the First
Amendment protections enjoyed by other persons, and Buckley and
Bellotti had already made clear that corporate expenditure limitations
were impermissible. Thus, the Court laid the foundation for revisiting
Austin and McConnell. To the majority, Austin represented an aber-
ration and a break from precedent: "Thus the law stood until Austin.
Austin 'uph[eld] a direct restriction on the independent expenditure of
funds for political speech for the first time in [this Court's]
history.' "333
In order to meet its burden under the strict scrutiny test, the gov-
ernment asserted three compelling interests in support of § 441b.
First, the government asserted an antidistortion interest that the Court
had found adequate in Austin. This interest was defined in Austin as
the prevention of "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense ag-
gregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corpo-
rate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support
for the corporation's political ideas." 334 The Court unambiguously
rejected this interest as adequate to justify corporate speech
restrictions. 335
The Court noted that the government's reasoning would allow it to
ban political books and other expressions of political opinion beyond
those at issue in this case. 3 3 6 Moreover, Buckley had squarely "re-
jected the premise that the Government has an interest 'in equalizing
the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome
of elections" 337 Likewise, Davis rejected this rationale when it invali-
332. Id. at 902-03.
333. Id. at 903 (alterations in original) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 695 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
334. Id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
335. The Court stated that any interpretation of footnote twenty-six in Bellotti that suggests
otherwise is misguided. Id. at 909. Footnote twenty-six in Bellotti suggested that the right of a
corporation to participate in a referendum implies no comparable right in the context of an
electoral campaign. Belloti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26. See also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
The Court also found its holding in National Right to Work inapposite. Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. at 909. In that case, discussed supra at notes 138-43 and accompanying text, the Court up-
held restrictions imposed on a labor union with respect to the solicitation of member contribu-
tions to a PAC. See FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-10 (1982). The Court
viewed National Right to Work as a case concerning contributions, not expenditures. See Citi-
zens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
336. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.
337. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 48 (1976)).
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dated the statute's millionaires' amendment.338 The Court also re-
jected the notion that corporations are distinguishable from wealthy
individuals on the ground that the former are creatures of state law
that are granted special advantages. 339 To the Court, this did not suf-
fice to sustain laws prohibiting speech because "the State cannot exact
as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amend-
ment rights" 340
The Court also held that whether a corporation's accumulation of
wealth is correlated with the public's support for its political beliefs
was of no relevance. According to the Court, "all speakers, including
individuals and the media," use funds that they accumulate in the
marketplace to fund their speech. 341 Despite the existing statutory ex-
ception for media corporations, the Court held that the government's
reasoning would allow it to extend its restrictions to such media cor-
porations. 342 Moreover, the mere existence of the media exemption
was "all but an admission of the invalidity of the antidistortion ratio-
nale."343 The exemption applies to media owned and controlled by
large corporations with interests far removed from the media, yet such
corporations are exempt from the restrictions.344 Finally, the Court
believed that the antidistortion rationale was further belied by the fact
that the vast majority of corporations are small enterprises that do not
have immense aggregations of wealth.345 The law would not prevent
large corporations from engaging in political activity by lobbying, for
example. 346 Instead, small corporations unable to engage in alterna-
tive forms of political activity would find themselves unable to object
to the practices of their more well-funded brethren.347
The second compelling interest asserted in support of § 441b was
the prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption. 348 The
Court forcefully reaffirmed Buckley's holding that this interest was
338. Id. (citing Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008)). See supra notes 250-57 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Davis decision.
339. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905.
340. Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 906. See supra note 190 and accompanying text for a discussion of the media
exemption.
344. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906.
345. Id. at 907 (citing various statistical sources).
346. Id.
347. See id. at 908.
348. Id.
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limited to the prevention of quid pro quo corruption. 349 The Court
also stressed that the distinction drawn in Buckley between restric-
tions on political contributions and political expenditures was predi-
cated on this limited view of corruption.3 50 According to the Court,
"[r]eliance on a 'generic favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds
with standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and
susceptible to no limiting principle.'" 3 51 The Court, referring to the
extensive McConnell record, 3 5 2 took the lack of direct examples of
votes being exchanged for expenditures as confirmation that "inde-
pendent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid
pro quo corruption."353 Even assuming that such expenditures pro-
vide access, the government's rationale could stand because
"[i]ngratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption." 354
Finally, the Court rejected the government's third asserted compel-
ling interest-protecting dissenting shareholders from being com-
pelled to fund corporate political speech.355 To the Court, many of
the infirmities that existed in the antidistortion rationale existed here
as well. For example, such a rationale would justify political speech
restrictions on media corporations.356 Moreover, § 441b was both
under- and over-inclusive in meeting this objective. It was under-in-
clusive because it only restricted certain forms of political speech and
only for a very limited time prior to a primary or general election.35 7
It was over-inclusive because the restrictions apply to all corporations,
including those owned by single shareholders. 35 8 The Court believed
349. Id.
350. Id. at 908-10.
351. Id. at 910 (alterations in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 296 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. The Court cited to its recent holding in another high profile case, Caperton v. A T
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), as further support for its holding. Citizens United, 130
S. Ct. at 910. In that case, the Court held that a judge must recuse himself from a case if a person
with an interest in the case had a significant and disproportionate influence, through fundraising
or other campaign activity, in placing the judge on the case when the case was pending or immi-
nent. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265. The Court, in Citizens United, stated that the remedy in that
case was recusal and not the banning of the litigant's political speech. 130 S. Ct. at 910.
355. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. The Government also asserted a fourth compelling
interest: the prevention of foreign influence in the nation's political process. Id. The Court did
not reach this issue because, even if this interest was found to be compelling, § 441b would be
defective nonetheless due to its overbreadth in reaching U.S. corporations. See id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
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that any such abuse could be corrected through other regulatory
mechanisms. 35 9
Having rejected all of the government's stated rationales, the Court
overruled Austin.360 Therefore, the government had no justification
for limiting independent corporate expenditures. The Court likewise
invalidated the restrictions on corporate electioneering communica-
tions imposed by § 441b of the McCain-Feingold Act and overruled
that portion of McConnell upholding this provision. 361 In perhaps its
most controversial holding, the Court also struck down the statutory
restriction on corporate express advocacy expenditures in general. 362
The disclaimer and disclosure rules were upheld as applied to the film
and the ads promoting the film, based on reasoning similar to that
found in Buckley and McConnell.363
VI. ANALYSIS & CRITIQUE
The Court's decision in Citizens United has generated a significant
amount of handwringing from proponents of campaign reform mea-
sures. In one fell swoop, the Court-according to its critics-opened
the door to corporate domination of the electoral process and dis-
turbed the century-old notion that corporate campaign participation
was subject to significant limitation. Predictions about whether the
Court's reasoning in Citizens United will be extended to strike down
other campaign finance limitations are best made with caution. The
fact that the Court has been bitterly divided over the permissibility of
campaign finance restrictions suggests that the composition of the
Court may be determinative of whether Citizens United is merely the
opening salvo in the dismantling of campaign finance restrictions or is
only an aberration.
However, it has not taken long for the effects of the decision to be
felt, at least by lower courts. On March 26, 2010, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that Citizens United compelled it to
strike down the contribution limitations imposed on a Section 527 or-
ganization that fell under the definition of a political committee.3 6
The court reasoned that the constitutional protection afforded by Citi-
zens United to independent political expenditures, including express
advocacy expenditures, should naturally extend to contributions to or-
359. See id.
360. Id. at 913.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 914-16.
364. See SpeechNow.org. v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 695-96 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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ganizations that make such expenditures. 365 Also, the Republican Na-
tional Committee recently challenged the McCain-Feingold Act's
restrictions on soft money donations to political parties. The district
court upheld the ban, and its decision was affirmed without opinion by
the Supreme Court, although it is unlikely that this case will be the
last word on soft money restrictions.366
The following sections assert that corporate speech rights should
not stand shoulder-to-shoulder with individual speech rights and may
be justifiably restricted in the appropriate circumstances. However,
corporate political speech does not present one of those
circumstances.
A. Corporate Speech Rights
The controversy generated by Citizens United began with the
Court's belief that corporations are entitled to First Amendment lib-
erties commensurate with those liberties enjoyed by natural persons.
Whether one ultimately concludes that Citizens United was correctly
decided depends, in large part, on whether one subscribes to that be-
lief. The First Amendment, on its face, protects speech without regard
to the identity of the speaker. Ample precedent exists to prove that
the First Amendment confers some protection to corporations. 367 Cit-
izens United did not break new ground in this regard. However,
365. Id. at 694 ("In light of the Court's holding as a matter of law that independent expendi-
tures do not corrupt or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to
groups that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance
of corruption.").
366. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, No. 08-1953, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29163 (D.D.C.
2010), affd. No. 09-1287, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5530 (D.C. Cir. June 29, 2010). See supra notes
183-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the restrictions imposed on soft money by the
McCain-Feingold Act. The repercussions from Citizens United have also extended to Congress.
See Op-Ed., Repealing the First Amendment, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2010, at A16 (commenting on
a bill to be proposed by Senator Charles Schumer and Representative Chris Van Hollen that
would regulate the campaign activity of corporations with more than 20% foreign shareholders,
recipients of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds, and government contractors). The
bill was introduced in the Senate on April 30, 2010. See Disclose Act, S. 3295, 111th Cong.
(2010). The bill has been subject to partisan wrangling and exemptions that have been provided
for certain nonprofit entities has proved to be particularly controversial. See Carl Huse, Loop-
holes Grow in Bill to Offset Campaign Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at Al (reporting on
the controversy caused by an exemption that would benefit the National Rifle Association).
Movement on the bill has stalled in the Senate where Democratic supporters of the bill have
failed to obtain a filibuster proof majority. See Greg Hitt & Brody Mullins, Campaign-Finance
Legislation Dead for Now, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2010, at A4.
367. Corporate personhood, for purposes of due process and equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, was established as early as 1886. See generally Santa Clara Cnty. v. S.
Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). The Court in Citizens United also provided an extensive list of
precedents for the existence of corporate rights to free speech. See supra note 324 and accompa-
nying text.
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should corporate liberties be subject to the same level of protection
that is provided to individuals in similar contexts? If not, did the
Court necessarily err in its conclusion? With respect to the first ques-
tion, corporate speech rights could justifiably be subjected to greater
restrictions than those that imposed on individual expression for two
reasons. First, corporate speech rights emanate from their societal
utility. Accordingly, sufficient policy-based reasons for restricting
such rights should be respected. Second, support for corporate speech
rights derived from the individual right of association is not
persuasive.
1. Utilitarian Basis for Corporate Speech Rights
Corporate and individual rights of expression are not identical be-
cause the reasons for protecting each differ. Corporate rights can only
be justified on utilitarian, or policy-based, grounds. Rights for individ-
uals may be similarly justified, but they also may be justified on a
more fundamental level. Moreover, attempts to align institutional
speech rights with individual rights by resorting to the right to freely
associate are not satisfactory. The derivation of corporate speech
rights from individual associational rights reflects a misunderstanding
of the nature of the modern corporation.
The right to freedom of speech is a fundamental right, and state-
imposed restrictions on such rights are accordingly subject to strict
scrutiny. However, identifying a right as fundamental begs the ques-
tion of why such a right is fundamental. A right may be considered
fundamental simply because people believe that the right is essential
to human respect and dignity. This Kantian view of fundamental
rights seems to apply most clearly to rights such as the right to free-
dom of religion,368 the right to be free from cruel and unusual punish-
ment,369 and the right to be free from racial discrimination. 370 The
Framers of the Constitution undoubtedly subscribed to this view, at
least in certain respects.371
368. U.S. CONST. amend I.
369. U.S. CONsT. amend VIII.
370. U.S. CONST. amend XIV. Immanuel Kant's philosophy of rights is often referred to as a
philosophy rooted in natural rights and argues that human beings are entitled to certain rights
simply by virtue of their status as free and autonomous beings capable of rational thought. A
detailed discussion of Kant is well beyond the scope of this work. For an introduction to Kant's
philosophy, see IMMANUEL KANT, BASIC WRITING OF KANT (Allen W. Wood ed., 2001).
371. The Declaration of Independence speaks of certain inalienable rights that were conferred
to individuals by their creator. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
Moreover, the Constitution was ratified, in part, in order to "secure the Blessings of Liberty."
U.S. CONsT. pmbl.
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It is certainly debatable that the freedom to express oneself has
Kantian roots and is essential for individuals to live meaningful lives.
In Whitney v. California, Justice Brandeis stated that "[t]hose who
won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties . . . ."372 Freedom of speech
may be viewed as a natural extension of freedom of thought, the quin-
tessential human characteristic. 373 To a certain extent, the self-actuali-
zation aspect of expression blurs into substantive due process claims
to autonomy. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the landmark
right to privacy case, Justice Douglas asserted that the existence of
peripheral rights-the freedom to read, to inquire, to teach, and to
associate, for example-emanate from the First Amendment and that
the existence of such peripheral rights is necessary to secure more ba-
sic rights.374 A similar justification was articulated by Justice Cardozo:
freedom of speech and expression are necessary to support other fun-
damental rights.375
Alternatively, a right may be considered fundamental because the
existence of such a right is necessary to the functioning of an ordered
society. A right premised on such a rationale is policy-based and is
subject to protection because its existence is essential to the well-be-
ing of society. Unlike the Kantian view of rights, this view regards
these rights as instrumental and rooted in a utilitarian rationale.
Therefore, although rights may be deemed fundamental under both
rationales, the reason for protecting such rights differs depending on
whether they are natural rights or policy-based.
If such rights are natural rights then they are not subject to tradi-
tional cost-benefit analysis. If they are policy-based, then they are.
Of course, many rights do not lend themselves to neat compartmental-
ization and can be supported on both grounds. For example, the ex-
clusionary rule and the right to confront adverse witnesses are
supportable by the theory that individuals are entitled to procedures
that provide fundamental fairness regardless of the utilitarian conse-
372. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
373. Justice Holmes, defending the right of a pacifist to become a naturalized citizen, stated
that "if there is any principle of the Constitution that any more imperatively calls for attachment
than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us
but freedom for the thought that we hate." United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55
(1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
374. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965).
375. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (stating that freedom of thought
and speech is "the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom"). This view
of freedom of speech presupposes a teleology of rights and considers freedom of speech a lower-
order-right necessary for the enjoyment of some higher-order-right or rights.
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quences of such practices.376 However, such rights can also be pre-
mised on utilitarian grounds-for example, such practices foster a
healthy respect for law enforcement and the criminal justice system.
Free speech rights may be similarly supported by both rationales. Jus-
tices Holmes and Brandeis, two giants of First Amendment jurispru-
dence, resorted to utilitarian rationales to support the right of free
expression.377 Whether the right to free speech is premised on natural
rights or policy-based considerations matters a great deal. Restric-
tions imposed on freedoms derived from natural rights would be more
difficult to support through compelling government interests because
such interests cannot rely on consequential or utilitarian rationales.
Policy-based rights, however, can be restricted if the utility of the state
restrictions in question are found to be both compelling and narrowly
tailored.
Leaving aside the justifications put forth for political speech, in gen-
eral, a corporation cannot have "natural rights." Whether such rights
emanate from a creator or deity or inherently attach to individuals by
virtue of their humanity, these rights cannot attach to a corporation
for the simple reason that a corporation is neither spawned by a crea-
tor or deity nor entitled to rights by virtue of its humanity. Corpora-
tions, according to Sir Edward Coke, "have no soul[ ]." 378
Corporate existence itself is based on utilitarian concepts. General
incorporation acts became prevalent in the late nineteenth century. 379
The corporate characteristics of unlimited life and limited liability
were established to facilitate both long-term business endeavors and
376. The exclusionary rule is a judicially developed doctrine that extends the Fourth Amend-
ment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring that evidence obtained
in such unreasonable searches and seizures be excluded from evidence at trial. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. A
recent Supreme Court case illustrated the Court's support of rights despite potential utilitarian
consequences. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), the Court held that
the accused had the right to confront the affiant whose affidavit regarding the results of forensic
testing of a substance found to be cocaine was admitted into evidence. Id. at 2532. Despite
protestations by the government that such a requirement would create tremendous practical
problems for law enforcement authorities, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's Confron-
tation Clause mandated this result. Id. at 2540-41.
377. "Those who won our independence . . . valued liberty both as an end and as a means....
They believed that freedom to think as you will and speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth . . . ." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Holmes's famous dissent in Abrams v. United States put
forth his position that society is best served by "free trade in ideas" and that truth is best tested
in the "competition of the market." 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
378. Liam Sdamus O'Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of the
Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 207 (2006) (quoting Case of Sutton's Hosp., 77 Eng.
Rep. 960, 973 (K.B. 1612)).
379. See id. at 218-19.
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the deployment of capital to make these endeavors possible. 380 To the
extent that the state felt compelled to confer legal benefits upon the
corporate structure, this compulsion sprang from the perceived public
benefits to be derived by successful business enterprises. Nobel Lau-
reate Ronald Coase theorized that the reason firms existed at all was
to serve as a mechanism to direct resources in a cost efficient man-
ner.381 Early- on, the Supreme Court recognized that a corporation's
raison d'itre was utilitarian. In Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, Chief Justice Marshall stated that the life of a corporation
allows "a perpetual succession of many persons" to act for the promo-
tion of a particular end, "like one immortal being."382 Similarly, Chief
Justice Taney emphasized that corporations exist to benefit the public
in the case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.383
The corporate social responsibility movement is a modern manifes-
tation of this view of corporations. Proponents of social responsibility
reject the shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance in
favor of a model that takes into account the interests of a diverse
group of stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, and the com-
munity at large. 384 However, even critics of corporate social responsi-
bility do not deny that the corporation exists to confer benefits to
society. For these critics, a corporation acts in a socially responsible
manner and benefits society by producing goods and services that sat-
isfy the needs or desires of its customers. 3 5 Shareholder wealth-max-
imization is therefore not an organization's principal objective but is
evidence of the extent to which an organization has had success in
achieving its principal purpose. 386 The debate over corporate social
responsibility is not over whether a corporation exists to serve the
public, but rather whether it meets its social obligation. Conse-
380. See id. at 232-33.
381. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937).
382. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 636 (1819).
383. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 548 (1837).
384. See, e.g., Edwin M. Epstein, The Good Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate Social
Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 207 (2007); David Hess, Social Re-
porting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41 (1999).
Traditionally, boards of directors owed a fiduciary duty to shareholders only. See Janet E. Kerr,
Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business Judgment Rule Pro-
tects a Board's Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDozo L. REv. 623, 636-37
(2007). However, courts, including the Delaware courts, have sanctioned the consideration by
boards and management of outside stakeholder interests. Id. at 637. Moreover, a number of
states have enacted "other constituency" statutes that permit officers and directors to consider
the interests of various stakeholders when making decisions. Id. at 638.
385. See, e.g., Peter Koslowski, The Limits of Shareholder Value, 27 J. Bus. Enics 137 (2000).
386. Id. at 141.
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quently, sufficient policy-based reasons for restricting corporate rights
ought to be respected.
2. Corporate Speech Rights Derived from the Freedom of
Association
In Citizens United, Justice Scalia-whose spirited concurrence took
the dissent to task for its insistence that the Framers intended freedom
of speech to extend only to individuals-supported corporate speech
rights on textual grounds. 387 He also provided another rationale: free-
dom of association. Justice Scalia wrote,
The dissent says that when the Framers "constitutionalized the
right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech
of individual Americans that they had in mind." . . . That is no doubt
true. All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of
individual men and women-not, for example, of trees or polar
bears. But the individual person's right to speak includes the right
to speak in association with other individual persons.388
Justice Scalia's reference to the associational rights of individuals
appears to shift corporate speech rights toward the fundamental-rights
end of the spectrum. Justice Scalia analogized corporate speech to the
speech of political parties and wrote that institutional speech is the
speech "of many individual Americans, who have associated in a com-
mon cause." 389 He did not clarify just who are the individuals that are
part of the association. Does it include shareholders only, or does it
also include creditors and employees? If the former, does this mean
that restrictions on single-shareholder corporations are more tolera-
ble? 390 Just what is their common cause?
Unlike members of a political party, the common cause of share-
holders is commercial in nature. In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court
held that the right of association does not turn on whether the beliefs
sought to be advanced pertain to political, economic, religious, or cul-
tural matters. 391 Moreover, this right is protected against state actions
that impose indirect impediments to the ability of individuals to asso-
ciate.392 However, indirect burdens are examined to determine their
likelihood of imposing a substantial restraint upon the exercise of
387. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
388. Id. at 928 (citation omitted).
389. Id.
390. Note that the majority opinion in Citizens United deemed the statute in question over-
broad with respect to the government's asserted interest in protecting minority shareholders
because it would also cover corporations owned by a single shareholder. See supra note 358 and
accompanying text.
391. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
392. See id. at 461.
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members' rights to freely associate.393 Consequently, the nexus be-
tween the group's common cause and the speech in question is rele-
vant to whether the state's impediment significantly and meaningfully
stifles individuals' ability to associate. Members do not associate in
corporate form to advance political beliefs. Restrictions on corporate
political speech neither prevent individuals from associating in corpo-
rate form, nor do they meaningfully stifle individuals' desire to
associate.
The nature of the modern corporation also weakens the claim that
corporate restrictions weaken individual associational rights. Justice
Scalia makes no distinction between small closely held corporations,
large publicly traded corporations, and those that fall between these
two extremes. Restrictions imposed on a single shareholder corpora-
tion impose no associational burdens. At the other end of the spec-
trum, a persuasive case may be made that associational rights weaken
considerably in a large publicly traded corporation-arguably, the
very entities that the legislation had in mind when it sought to limit
corporate participation in the electoral process.394
The notion that a corporation with several hundred thousand or
more shareholders implicates significant associational liberty appears
to grossly exaggerate the rights of association. The law has recognized
that rights to freely associate are more likely to give way to other com-
peting goals as the number of members in the association grows
larger. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a case in point.3 9 5
The importance of such rights is placed in further doubt by the fact
that the identities of the shareholders in a publicly traded corporation
change by the minute. Also, given the prevalence of institutional
shareholders, how far removed may individuals be from the speaker
before the right to speak in association with other individuals becomes
too attenuated to be taken seriously? 396
To equate the rights of individuals with the rights of an association
of individuals manifested in a corporate form would call into question
393. Id. at 462.
394. Although the legislation in question covered all corporations, the fear of corporate ag-
gregations of wealth that motivated the statutory restrictions implies that large corporations
were the prime target of those restrictions.
395. The freedom to associate with persons of one's choosing is overcome by the state's inter-
est in a workplace free from discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender, religion, and
national origin if fifteen or more persons are employed by the company for a statutorily deter-
mined period. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(b) (2006).
396. Individuals are at least two levels removed from the corporation in question to the extent
that corporate shares are held by mutual funds, pension plans, hedge funds, and other institu-
tional investors. To the extent that such funds are aggregates of other funds-a fund of funds,
for example-individuals are even more remote from the corporation in question.
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a host of speech restrictions imposed on corporations under the fed-
eral securities laws. Many of the restrictions imposed on corporations
under these laws go beyond the traditional justifications for commer-
cial speech restrictions and would not be tolerated if imposed upon an
individual. For example, mandatory quiet periods are imposed on is-
suers of new securities, and regulations dictate to whom speech is to
be directed.397
Finally, as discussed above, the majority opinion in Citizens United
dismissed the government's asserted compelling interest in protecting
shareholders from subsidizing speech with which they disagree.398
The Court did not deny that corporate political speech does present
such problems but believed that the statutory ban was both over- and
under-inclusive and that traditional corporate governance procedures
were adequate to address this issue.399 The fact that this issue exists at
all belies the notion that corporate political speech is a manifestation
of the views of various individuals joined together in a common cause.
Unanimity is difficult to find in any organization, and disparities be-
tween the views of those in the majority and those in the minority are
not unique to corporate governance. However, the extent to which
this issue presents itself in the corporate world is unique, and the re-
cent scandals involving executive compensation can cause one to
question whether the Court's faith in the policing effects of the corpo-
rate governance process is unduly optimistic. 400 A recent study has
indicated that corporate political expenditures are motivated more by
the predilections of management than by the furtherance of long-term
397. See Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REV. 863, 871 (2007) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2006)).
398. See supra notes 355-59 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 357-59 and accompanying text.
400. Executive compensation practices have been subject to severe criticism for some time.
See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); William Arthur Wines & Thomas M.
Fuhrmann, An Inquiry into CEO Compensation Practices in the United States and Proposals for
Federal Law Reform, 43 NEw ENG. L. REV. 221 (2008). Such practices have been thought to
have contributed to various corporate scandals such as those involving Enron and WorldCom
and to the recent economic problems. See generally Matthew A. Melone, Are Compensatory
Stock Options Worth Reforming?, 38 GONZAGA L. REV. 535, 572-89 (2003). As a result, vari-
ous legislative attempts to improve these practices have been instituted. For example, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provides for the clawback of compensation in certain circum-
stances. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304(a), 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243
(2006)). More recently, legislation that implemented TARP imposed compensation-clawback
provisions and limitations on compensation and tax deductions thereon. See Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765; American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115.
[Vol. 60:2986
2010] CITIZENS UNITED & CORP. POLITICAL SPEECH 87
corporate interests.401 The current debate over "say on pay" provi-
sions and proxy access provides further evidence of the disconnect be-
tween the members of the corporate association.402
401. The study examined the relationship between political donations and firm returns. See
Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke & Tracy Wang, Corporate Political Contributions: Invest-
ment or Agency? (European Finance Ass'n, Meeting Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=972670. A positive relation between donations and firm returns is expected if such
donations are driven by firm objectives-donations the authors term "investments." Id. at 13,
16. In contrast, a negative relation between donations and returns would imply that donations
were motivated to a great extent by management's desire to demonstrate its power and prestige,
obtain high-profile cabinet or ambassadorial positions, or other such idiosyncratic reasons. Id.
The authors found a negative correlation between donations and firm returns. Id. at 38-39. The
Center for Responsive Politics reported that forty major ambassadorships were granted to large
donors to President George W. Bush and the Republican Party between 2000 and 2004 and that
thirty-three of such ambassadorships were given to corporate chief executive officers, presidents,
founders, or their immediate family members. Id. at 13.
402. Shareholders of TARP assistance recipients are entitled to a non-binding vote on execu-
tive compensation. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 7001, 123 Stat. at
519-20. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has not provided shareholders of non-
TARP recipients with a "say on pay," although some prominent companies, such as Verizon
Communications and Motorola, have provided shareholders with a non-binding vote on execu-
tive compensation. See Joann S. Lublin, A Quiet Response to 'Say on Pay' Measures, WALL ST.
J., May 18, 2009, at B6. During the 2009 proxy season, seventy-six shareholder proposals for an
advisory vote on executive compensation were submitted and received the support of 45.6% of
the votes cast. See Governance Shareholder Proposals-Executive Pay Issues, 2009 PROXY SEA-
SON SCORECARD, http://www.riskmetrics.com/knowledge/proxyseason-scorecard2009 (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2011). The House of Representatives has passed a bill that would require publicly
traded entities to provide shareholders with a non-binding vote on executive compensation and
golden parachute arrangements. See Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness
Act of 2009, H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 957, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010),
signed into law on July 21, 2010, requires that proxy statements include, at least once every three
years, a non-binding resolution to approve executive compensation. Moreover, not less than
every six years, the proxy statement must include a separate resolution to determine whether
such vote must occur every one, two, or three years. Shareholders of British firms have the
ability to cast advisory votes on compensation matters and have increasingly dissented on man-
agement proposals-including a remarkable fifty-nine percent vote against the compensation
plans of Royal Dutch Shell Group. See Muck, Brass and Spleen, ECONOMIST, May 23, 2009, at
70; Guy Chazan & Joann S. Lublin, Shell Investors Revolt over Executive Pay Plan, WALL ST. J.,
May 20, 2009, at Bl. With respect to proxy access, current law provides for shareholder nomi-
nees to the board of directors to be placed on the corporate proxy ballot only if the corporate
charter or bylaws permit such access. Very few corporations permit such access. The alternative
is to mount a challenge to management's slate of directors. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of
Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1263-65 (2009). Current SEC proxy rules require
that shareholders seeking to nominate directors in this fashion adhere to the proxy disclosure
rules-a very expensive undertaking. See id. at 1265. In 2009, the SEC proposed new rules that
would grant shareholders meeting certain ownership and holding period requirements access to
corporate ballots. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (pro-
posed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposing Rule 14a-11, which would
allow shareholders meeting certain ownership and holding period requirements to nominate the
greater of one director or twenty-five percent of directors being elected provided that state law
or the corporate governing document are not violated). Section 971 of the Dodd-Frank Act
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The Court's insistence in Citizens United that the First Amendment
permits no discrimination based on the identity of the speaker is not
persuasive. The Court itself noted that several speaker-based restric-
tions have been upheld.403 The Court did take pains to distinguish
those cases from the case it confronted.404 Nonetheless, the fact that
Citizens United was distinguishable from those cases does not mean
that the law can never distinguish among speakers. As discussed
above, the federal securities laws impose speech restrictions on certain
types of corporations. 405 The cases cited by the Court merely illus-
trated that the asserted government interests in those cases were
found to be sufficiently compelling. In contrast, the government's as-
serted justifications in Citizens United were not.
B. Policy-Based Support for Corporate Political Speech
The belief that corporate and individual speech rights should not be
entitled to similar protections from state interference does not imply
that Citizens United was wrongly decided. Instead, corporate speech
rights must be firmly grounded in policy-based principles. With re-
spect to political speech, such principles do provide adequate support
for limited government interference for four broad reasons. First, the
heightened protection afforded to political speech is based on the sig-
nificant societal utility of such speech. The fact that political speech
emanates from a corporate speaker does not diminish its utility. Sec-
ond, support for provisions that stifle corporate speech is premised on
a particularly dispiriting view of elections and the electorate. Third,
the preoccupation with wealth that underlies support for corporate
speech restrictions is simplistic and grossly exaggerates the effect that
corporate participation in electoral debates has on the political pro-
cess. Finally, the imposition of corporate speech restrictions in the
political context is a classic case of treating a symptom of a disease
while leaving the underlying cause untreated. Restrictions on corpo-
rate electoral participation will do little to ameliorate the problems
perceived by would-be reformers because the problems have their
genesis in the behavior of elected officials.
provides that the SEC may prescribe rules that permit shareholders to include nominees for
election as directors in proxy statements. § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915.
403. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
404. Id.
405. See supra note 397 and accompanying text.
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1. The Social Utility of Political Speech
The utility of political speech is derived principally from its propen-
sity to inform and agitate the electorate. Although all speech has the
propensity to inform the listener, political speech has achieved its ex-
alted position in First Amendment jurisprudence because its informa-
tive tendencies support vital societal objectives. "Speech is an
essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials
accountable to the people.. .. The right of citizens to inquire, to hear,
to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition
to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect
it."406 Professor Zentner captured the essence of political speech:
[T]the modern state is personified rather than discovered. Because
that state is merely a human creation, its legitimacy must be estab-
lished and maintained. Unlike other kinds of expression and action,
political speech precisely concerns this matter. This is the general
reason why the Court has traditionally thought that political speech
should be the most protected kind of expression, that government
regulation of political speech has until recently been very limited,
i.e., strictly scrutinized. Indeed, as we shall see, limited government
results in citizens that are more, rather than less, politically active.
Citizens in the modern world often exhibit their political nature
through opposition to the state, not through submission to it.407
Professor Zentner's view of political speech echoes Justice Car-
dozo's sentiment that speech rights are protective of higher order
rights.408 The freedom to express political views may be considered
subordinate to other rights but it is nonetheless vital to the continued
enjoyment of higher order rights. Note that political speech rights,
when viewed in this context, are not based on any fundamental right
possessed by the listener, for this would impose on persons a duty to
speak. Political speech, in and of itself, has inherent social value, and
that social value is diminished neither because it originates from cor-
porate "lips" nor because of the corporation's motivation for such
speech.
Milton Freidman, the patron saint of the shareholder-primacy
model of corporate governance, has posited that corporate social re-
sponsibility for its own sake is illegitimate. Boards of directors and
management that expend corporate funds for purposes other than
shareholder wealth maximization are, in effect, imposing a tax upon
406. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
407. Scot J. Zentner, Revisiting McConnelL Campaign Finance and the Problem of Democ-
racy, 23 J.L. & POL. 475, 496 (2007).
408. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
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the shareholders to fund social benefits.409 Moreover, corporate man-
agement is ill-equipped to decide which of many desirable social
objectives should be funded.410 Freidman, however, does not object
to corporate expenditures for social purposes if, in the judgment of
management, such expenditures will benefit the shareholders. 411 Con-
sequently, corporate expenditures or activities directed toward social
ends are acceptable if such expenditures will, for example, increase
customer goodwill, improve employee morale, or burnish a corporate
brand. In effect, corporate management may undertake socially desir-
able activities under the cover of the business judgment rule.4 12 The
shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance would therefore
deny that corporate political speech has as its primary purpose any-
thing other than a commercial benefit. The fact that corporate politi-
cal speech may stimulate debate and edify the public is merely
incidental to the corporation's purpose of maximizing its wealth. Oth-
erwise, such expenditures are illegitimate. However, rejection of the
stakeholder model of corporate governance in favor of Friedman's
view does not suggest that corporate political speech is susceptible to
recharacterization as commercial speech. The motivation for speech
is irrelevant to its classification.
Commercial speech has enjoyed constitutional protection, albeit at
a lesser level than political speech, for almost fifty years.413 Restric-
tions imposed upon commercial speech are not subject to exacting
scrutiny but instead are examined under an intermediate standard.414
In general, truthful communications about a lawful activity are pro-
tected.415 The Court has defined commercial speech as speech that
409. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine) at 122.
410. See id.
411. Id.
412. The business judgment rule is a judicially developed doctrine that insulates corporate
directors and officers from claims that they have breached their fiduciary duty of care to share-
holders. This rule is operative if the actions taken by such directors or officers were the result of
due deliberation after consideration of all material information. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984). In effect, this rule protects directors and officers from second-guessing by
shareholders with the benefit of hindsight. See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 (Del. Ch.
2002). The business judgment rule manifests the reality that directors and officers manage the
corporation, not the shareholders. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Orman, 794 A.2d at 19-20.
See also Lyman P.O. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 Bus. LAW.
439 (2004).
413. See, e.g., Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
414. Commercial speech restrictions must be supported by a substantial, as opposed to a com-
pelling, government interest and such restrictions must be proportional to that interest. See
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
415. See id.; Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
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does no more than propose a commercial transaction. 416 However,
the fact that speech is motivated by the economic interests of the
speaker is not relevant to the classification of speech. Instead, the
inquiry into the nature of the speech is focused on the content of such
speech according to Justice Stevens:
Neither a labor leader's exhortation to strike, nor an economist's
dissertation on the money supply, should receive any lesser protec-
tion because the subject matter concerns only the economic inter-
ests of the audience. Nor should the economic motivation of a
speaker qualify his constitutional protection; even Shakespeare may
have been motivated by the prospect of pecuniary reward. 417
Moreover, commercial speech that relates to a constitutionally pro-
tected activity is afforded traditional First Amendment protection.418
The content of the speech is what matters, and surely the expression
of the political views of a corporation, despite its motivation, does far
more than propose a commercial transaction.
2. Paternalism and the Electorate
Support for corporate speech restrictions implicates a particularly
unflattering view of citizen participation in the electoral process. One
view of the electoral process, the "pluralistic-protective," sees the pur-
pose of politics as a mechanism to aggregate voter preferences to en-
able such voters to either obtain government benefits or to protect
existing benefits or entitlements.419 Those participants with greater
wealth are advantaged due to the fact that their superior resources
enable them to more effectively mobilize their supporters.420 The plu-
ralistic-protective model discounts the value of political speech be-
cause it views preferences as more or less fixed. 421 Consequently,
political speech is simply a method of making those preferences
known.
In contrast, the "republican-communitarian" perspective views the
political process as a mechanism to foster debate and, through deliber-
ation, shape preferences and reach collective decisions about the pub-
lic good. 4 2 2 Under this approach, political speech does more than
merely accumulate preferences-it also helps shape preferences. The
416. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 562; Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760-61;
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
417. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
418. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822 (holding that advertisements related to abortion are fully
protected under the First Amendment).
419. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 1, at 1723.
420. Id. at 1724.
421. Id. at 1723-24.
422. Id.
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republican-communitarian view attains support from the electoral
process in the United States, in which political campaigns are not lim-
ited by the narrow time frames applicable to elections in certain par-
liamentary systems.423
Campaign reforms that seek to remove the supposed distorting in-
fluence of corporate wealth are premised on an unflattering profile of
the typical voter. Proponents of reform call into question the civic
capabilities of voters-the paradox of campaign finance reform-and
suggest that certain bases for voting decisions are inferior to others.424
Professors Issacharoff and Karlan forcefully portrayed reformers' im-
age of voters:
The reformers' agenda is driven by the image of a quite different
consumer of political news, sitting in his armchair in front of a quite
different screen. Most of the money that they see as having cor-
rupted our political system goes into television spots, particularly
emotional attack advertising. The thoughtful citizen can simply dis-
regard these noxious offerings or turn off the TV. Not for nothing
was the remote control invented. But the reformers must believe
that most voters are not thoughtful citizens. Rather, voters are
"civic slackers," who devote little time and less real thought to how
to vote. Thus, money, in the guise of spending on substantively vac-
uous mass media advertising, distorts the election process by influ-
encing how these slackers cast their ballots.425
If this jaded view of the electorate is accurate, then it is difficult to
discern the benefit of corporate speech restrictions. In effect, this
view is an admission that any sort of influence is harmful and that true
egalitarian reform will prohibit all mass media advocacy. Moreover,
just who is to decide what forms of influence are legitimate and which
reasons for casting a ballot in favor of a particular candidate are ap-
propriate? This is dangerous territory, and territory that most reason-
able people should avoid. In any event, if the American electorate is
genuinely comprised of civic slackers, then the problems with the po-
litical system go well beyond inordinate corporate participation.
3. Is Corporate Wealth Singularly Distorting?
The obsession with corporate wealth as the principal impediment to
the attainment of an egalitarian political system reflects a simplistic
view of politics. The demonization of corporate wealth suggests that
423. See Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Logic of Campaign Finance Regulation, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 373, 377-79 (2009).
424. See Daniel Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 893, 895, 909-10 (1998).
425. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 1, at 1727 (citations omitted).
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such wealth, as a competitive advantage, is somehow unique and espe-
cially corrosive. Austin and McConnell both accepted the govern-
ment's contention that the state had a compelling interest in
neutralizing the aggregation of corporate wealth made possible by
state conferred advantages. 426 Admittedly, the state makes possible
the very existence of corporations and has created the legal architec-
ture that has allowed many corporations to prosper and grow to sizes
unimaginable a mere half-century ago. However, by no means are
state-created advantages applicable singularly to corporations. Indi-
vidual aggregations of wealth are similarly indebted to actions of the
state. The laws of inheritance and descent, the exclusivity of intellec-
tual property rights, and the enforcement of contracts are the most
obvious examples of state encouragement of the aggregation of
wealth-whether by corporations or individuals.
It is supremely ironic that the corporate form itself has, in signifi-
cant respects, contributed to immense concentrations of wealth by in-
dividuals. The liability shield conferred by the corporate form and the
establishment of well-functioning public securities markets, for exam-
ple, have assisted in the amassment of great personal fortunes. 427
Moreover, any supposed advantage that is uniquely conferred by a
corporate treasury may be eroding without the helping hand of the
state. Technological advancements have resulted in an increasing fo-
cus on small hard money donations during the last two presidential
election cycles-a trend that was exploited vigorously and most effec-
tively by then-Senator Obama in 2008.428 There is no evidence to sug-
gest that this trend will not continue. To the contrary, one would
expect that as the political operatives gain expertise in this type of
fundraising, its importance will increase in future elections.
As discussed above, a particularly jaded view of the electorate is
implied by the belief that wealth is an advantage that should be sub-
ject to heightened scrutiny by the state.429 Assuming arguendo that
such a view of the body politic is warranted, it is difficult to compre-
hend why wealth is singularly distorting. For example, if wealth is re-
moved as an electoral advantage, are we to believe that some other
advantage will not take its place? It is difficult to discern any public
426. See supra notes 144-50, 223-32 and accompanying text.
427. The current economic crisis illustrates the role that the limited liability of the corporate
form plays in protecting personal fortunes. The great Wall Street investment houses were, at one
time, general partnerships. Had they remained in such form it is likely that many individual
fortunes would have been wiped out, or at least greatly compromised, by the astounding losses
incurred by many of the investment firms.
428. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 419-25 and accompanying text.
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advantage derived from a political system dominated by .those with
the time to devote to political matters or by those well-situated to
bundle contributions, for example.430 Contrary to the beliefs of
would-be reformers, wealth can actually have democratizing effects.
In a more or less free market, a capitalistic society's wealth is fluid. It
tends, over time, to destabilize entrenched interests and to create new
centers of power, often with different political views. After all, IBM
begat Bill Gates who begat Google. The phrase "what's good for
General Motors is good for the country" is a sad reminder of how
quickly fortunes can change. 431 James Madison recognized long ago
that commercial interests tended to both create a diverse society and
inhibit the installation of a permanent majority.432
4. The Exaggerated Consequences of Corporate Political Speech
The reformers who insist on limiting the political arena of corporate
speech greatly exaggerate the effect that such speech has on political
outcomes. The notion that corporate spending will overwhelm com-
peting voices and result in inordinate corporate electoral influence is
necessarily premised on a monolithic view of corporate interests. Re-
ality intrudes on this view rather rudely. To believe that corporations
behave in lockstep on matters of free trade, intellectual property pro-
tection, tax policy, energy policy, and other similar issues is naive. The
debate over the recently enacted health care legislation illustrates this
point nicely. Differences of opinion between and among insurance
companies, large employers, and medical providers surfaced regularly.
In fact, rather than dominate the conversation, corporate political
speech will lead to more vigorous debate. Does anyone really doubt
that a corporate political advertisement supporting or opposing a par-
ticular position or candidate will not generate an immediate response
by corporations with competing views? It is not too much to assume,
for example, that an advertisement by the cable industry supporting a
position favorable to its interest would be met vigorously by a compet-
ing advertisement from Verizon Communications, AT&T, or
DirecTV. Moreover, Citizens United not only freed corporations from
430. Bundling refers to the practice of accumulating hard money donations from numerous
individual contributors. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. Certain special interests
may be particularly well positioned to engage in this practice. See, e.g., James R. Copland, Op-
Ed., How the Plaintiffs Bar Bought the Senate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2010, at A17.
431. This phrase has been attributed to Charles Wilson, a former president of General Mo-
tors. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 262-63 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part).
432. See Zentner, supra note 407, at 498-99 (quoting THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James
Madison)).
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political speech restrictions; it also freed organized labor, the proto-
typical corporate antagonist, from these restrictions.433 Interest
groups attempt to derive "'specific, concentrated benefits from the
political system . . . . But if you have competing interest groups you
don't end up with a systematic bias toward bad policy."' 434
In addition, the fear of corporate hegemony in the political process
ignores the existence of internal and external constraints on corporate
political activity. Corporations tend to keep a low public profile on
contentious political matters. As previously discussed, corporations
were large soft money donors but were not deeply engaged with Sec-
tion 527 groups.435 Soft money donations to political parties provided,
at least in the minds of corporate managers, greater opportunities for
access to elected officials than contributions to ideologically driven
organizations. Moreover, "bet-hedging"-the practice of donating to
both major parties-is a common corporate practice and further evi-
dences that access is the principal motivating factor behind most cor-
porate political expenditures. 436
Although Citizens United may prompt additional corporate spend-
ing on issue advocacy, it is unlikely to lead to unfettered spending in
direct support or opposition of a candidate. The risk of backing the
wrong horse and the concomitant lack of access that may be caused by
open opposition to the eventual officeholder is a risk that most corpo-
rations will not shoulder. Moreover, corporations will undoubtedly
consider the possibility that open advocacy will generate a response
from corporate interests that favor the opposing candidate. In addi-
tion, corporations are constrained by the potential reaction of custom-
ers, employees, shareholders, public interest groups, and non-
governmental organizations to open advocacy. 437 Unseemly corpo-
rate campaigning may result in the loss of customers, employee dissat-
433. In certain respects, Citizens United may benefit labor unions more than corporations
because the internal and external restraints on labor union political activity may be weaker than
similar constraints applicable to corporate activity. See Steven J. Law, Organized Labor and
Citizens United, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2010, at A15.
434. Peter Robinson, 'Basically an Optimist' - Still, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2010, at A13 (quot-
ing Nobel Prize winning economist Gary Becker). See also James Taranto, Op-Ed., The Media
and Corporate Free Speech, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2010, at A13 (interviewing Floyd Abrams,
perhaps the preeminent First Amendment practitioner).
435. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
436. See generally Jason Cohen, The Same Side of Two Coins: The Peculiar Phenomenon of
Bet-Hedging in Campaign Finance, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 271 (2006).
437. See, e.g., Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political
Contributions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2010, at A2 (reporting on nationwide demonstrations by gay
rights activists outside Target stores prompted by Target's support for a gubernatorial candidate
that opposes same-sex marriage). Public interest groups and non-governmental organizations
have played an increasingly prominent role in corporate governance matters. See, e.g., Amiram
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isfaction, or shareholder agitation in the form of proxy fights.438
Disclosure rules, consistently upheld by the Court, should be adequate
to assure that corporations cannot avoid the constraints imposed upon
open advocacy. If not, the answer is to strengthen the disclosure rules,
not ban the speech.439
Corporations prefer their political activity at the wholesale, not the
retail, level. Corporate influence is exercised most effectively through
access to political decisionmakers. Access to those decisionmakers is
often made available simply by virtue of a corporate officer's reputa-
tion or due to the fact that the corporation is a large employer of an
elected official's constituents.440 Lobbying and the placement of per-
sons sympathetic to corporate points of view in prominent regulatory
positions allow the corporations to confer with decisionmakers behind
closed doors.441 Such practices are not necessarily illegitimate. Regu-
lators may not be in a position to fully comprehend the myriad issues
attendant to complex corporate matters. Corporate input may actu-
Gill, Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: A Research Agenda, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 452 (2008).
438. Access to the ballot for shareholder proposals concerning corporate political activity may
be challenged by the corporation on the grounds that whether or not such activity is conducted is
exclusively a managerial prerogative. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2009); Abbott Laborato-
ries, SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 851564 (Feb. 11, 2009).
439. For example, if corporations attempt to engage in open advocacy through the cover of
trade organizations, then disclosure rules should be put in place that will shed light on such
practices. See supra text accompanying note 259. Advances in communications technology have
made disclosure regimes more effective irrespective of the policy goals sought to be advanced by
disclosure. See The Open Society, A Special Report on Managing Information, EcONOMIsT, Feb.
27, 2010, at 11-12 (discussing government use of technology to provide public access to various
information). See also L. Gordon Crovitz, Digital Technology and Cleaner Politics, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 8, 2010, at A19.
440. For an excellent and in-depth discussion of corporate political activity, see Jill E. Fisch,
How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005).
441. Lobbying activities and lobbyists are subject to widespread regulation. A discussion of
such regulations is beyond the scope of this work. See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating
Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 1 (2006). Critics of
the federal bailout of financial institutions during the current economic crisis are quick to note
that many government officials with responsibility for crafting the bailout, including former sec-
retary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, were formerly employed by Goldman Sachs. See, e.g.,
Gretchen Morgenson & Don Van Natta, Jr., Paulson's Call to Goldman Tested Ethics During
Crisis, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2009, at Al. The financial services industry has lobbied vigorously to
shape to its liking any legislation that revises regulation of its industry. See Robert Cyran &
James Pethokoukis, Formidable Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, at B2. Corporate-friendly
regulators lead to the phenomenon of "regulatory capture." One scholar has asserted that the
FEC itself has been captured by incumbent politicians. See generally Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much
Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625 (2007). See aiso Andrew Martin,
Does This Bank Watchdog Have a Bite?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at BU1 (reporting about the
criticism directed at John Dugan, the Comptroller of the Currency, due to his relationships with
the banking industry).
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ally mitigate the potential for policy mistakes due to informational
asymmetries. To the extent that such practices are objectionable, they
have nothing to do with the corporate speech made possible by Citi-
zens United. In contrast to this stealthy influence, corporate electoral
speech is transparent and subject to public scrutiny.
5. The Root of the Campaign Finance Problem: Politicians
Finally, as noted by Professors Issacharoff and Karlan, money is like
water-it will always find an outlet.4 4 2 The campaign reformers are
aiming at the wrong target. Corporate money has no purchasing
power if nothing is for sale. Public choice theory posits that elected
officials are not, as a whole, public-regarding models of civic virtue. 443
Instead, they seek to further their own selfish ends-usually reelec-
tion.4 4 4 Professor David Mayhew's seminal study of Congress found
that legislators have a singular focus on reelection and influence-gath-
ering.445 Favors are granted, earmarks are enacted, and self-perpetu-
ating legislation is proposed and passed. 4 4 6 Campaign finance reform
is part of this pattern of behavior. It is decidedly pro-incumbent be-
cause it poses obstacles to challengers in overcoming the advantages
of incumbency. Incumbents enjoy certain inherent advantages, in-
cluding broad name recognition and concomitant fundraising
advantages,
Because the law itself defines the extent of a democracy, those
who create it "have the capacity to shape, manipulate, and distort
democratic processes." Thus Congress, as the body that controls
the existing arrangement for campaign finance structure, has the ca-
pacity to make the rules and . . . "[h]istorical experience provides
convincing reasons to believe that those who currently hold power
will deploy that power to try to preserve their control." 447
One commentator likened Congress' behavior in enacting the Cam-
paign Act to the behavior expected from an oil cartel. 448 Any restric-
tions imposed on campaign activities increases the relative advantages
442. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
443. See Jill E. Fisch, The "Bad Man" Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1611 (2006).
444. Id.
445. See Robert P. Beard, Note, Whacking the Political Money Mole Without Whacking
Speech: Accounting for Congressional Self-Dealing in Campaign Finance Reform After Wisconsin
Right to Life, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 731, 763 (citing DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELEC-
TORAL CONNECTION 5-7 (1974)).
446. Id.
447. Id. at 764 (quoting SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RiCHARD H. PILDES,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 2 (rev. 2d ed. 2002)).
448. See Stefanuca, supra note 24, at 262-67.
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of incumbency. To believe that corporate advocacy will distort the
political process and lead to public lack of confidence in the system is
to miss the point that influence will continue to be sought by other
means. As long as elected officials offer themselves up for sale there
will be buyers. Even if one believes that corporate express advocacy
will become a currency for influence peddling, it is less objectionable
than other forms of currying political favors: at least corporate advo-
cacy is transparent.
VII. CONCLUSION
Almost four decades of First Amendment jurisprudence dealing
with campaign finance has yet to provide anything closely resembling
a consensus on the permissible boundaries of campaign finance re-
strictions. Ultimately, those who believe that money is the over-
whelming factor in determining who gets elected will never be
convinced that Citizens United has any merit. In contrast, those who
believe that campaign finance restrictions are manifestations of rent-
seeking incumbents and reflect an especially pessimistic view of the
electorate praise Citizens United for vindicating cherished rights. The
bitterly divided Court makes it difficult to predict whether this case
will have the long pedigree enjoyed by Buckley or the short lifespan of
Austin and McConnell. However, it is unlikely that, in practice, Citi-
zens United will usher in a new era of corporate political dominance.
Most likely, the public will discern little difference in the conduct of
future campaigns.
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